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BEYOND THE LIABILITY WALL: STRENGTHENING TORT 
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Noah Sachs 
Despite decades of effort, the international community has stumbled in 
attempts to craft tort remedies for victims of transboundary environmental 
damage. More than a dozen civil liability treaties have been negotiated 
that create causes of action and prescribe liability rules, but few have entered 
into force, and most remain unadapted orphans in international envi-
ronmental law. In this Article, I explain the problematic record of tort 
liability regimes by developing a theoretical model of liability negotiations 
grounded in regime theory from political science. Based on this model, I 
conclude that negotiated liability regimes have foundered because of three 
main roadblocks: ( 1) interest conflicts between developed and developing 
states; (2) high transaction costs and low expected payoffs; and (3) incor-
poration of treaty provisions that are too onerous for states to accept. I con-
clude that strengthening tort remedies wiU require changing the substantive 
content of liability treaties and the process of negotiating them. I also show 
how liability principles can be strengthened outside the treaty-making proc-
ess through diffusion of norms against trans boundary environmental damage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past four decades, states have discussed, deliberated, and 
debated how to strengthen tort liability principles within international 
environmental law. In declarations, conference reports, and treaties, states 
have committed to make liability work for the environment, both as a 
means of deterring harmful activities and as a means of compensating 
parties injured by transboundary pollution. 
Despite these ambitious pronouncements, states' actual accomplish} 
ments in the liability field have been quite meager. States have been 
unwilling to accept treaty language that would impose liability for 
transboundary pollution on states directly (so-called state liability). 1 In 
the realm of private international law, which is the focus of this 
Article, states have also rejected most civil liability treaties establishing 
the tort liability of private actors for transboundary pollution.2 Effective 
1. See RENE LEFEBER, TRANSBOUNDAR Y ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCE AND THE 
ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY 299 nn.242-43 (1996); see also Thomas Gehring & Markus 
Jachtenfuchs, Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage: Towards a General Liability 
Regime?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 92, 106 (1993) ("There is no indication ... that [states) are now 
ready to accept a convention imposing on them a general international liability for 
transnational environmental damage."). For a discussion of the drawbacks of state liability 
as a vehicle for strengthening tort principles in international environmental law, see Jutta 
Brunnee, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for 
Environmental Protection, 53 lNT'L & COMP. L.Q. 351 (2004 ). 
2. I use "transboundary" pollution as a broad term that encompasses two distinct 
types of pollution. First, it refers to the flow of pollution (through watercourses, oceans, or 
the air and atmosphere) from a source state to an affected state. Second, it refers to pollution 
caused by international trade in hazardous materials. In the second sense of the term, the 
activities that can cause environmental damage, such as transport, management, and disposal of 
Beyond the Liability Wall 839 
tort liability rules, it seems, are the Yeti of international environmental 
law-pursued for years, sometimes spotted in rough outlines, but remarka-
bly elusive in practice. 
Of the fourteen major civil liability treaties that have been adopted 
in the environmental field since 1960, only six have ever entered into 
force, and actual claims for compensation under these treaties are scarce.3 
Civil liability treaties are designed to harmonize private tort law across 
jurisdictions for specified types of transboundary environmental damage. 
They usually contain rules regarding which actors can be held financially 
responsible, the underlying type of liability (strict or fault-based), proce-
dures for bringing claims, caps on damages, and insurance require-
ments. However, with so many stillborn treaties, the practical impact of 
civil liability treaties on enhancing tort remedies has been negligible. 
Notably, not a single major civil liability treaty outside the contexts of 
oil spills and nuclear accidents has entered into force, each having fallen 
far short of the number of necessary ratifications. They remain dead 
letters, or as the United Nations Environment Programme more delicately 
put it, they have fallen into a "spell of dormancy."4 
The lack of widely ratified liability rules has serious consequences 
for deterrence, accountability, compensation of victims, and the global 
environment. Without specific treaties setting the ground rules for tort 
suits, individuals harmed by transboundary pollution have few viable 
avenues for redress because of what I call "liability walls"-procedural 
hurdles to bringing transnational tort suits. Firms causing transboundary 
pollution (whether by air, water, or disposal of hazardous wastes) are 
protected by these liability walls and can continue to externalize envi-
ronmental damage to other countries. 
The absence of effective remedies is highlighted by the illegal dump-
ing in August 2006 of 528 tons of caustic hazardous waste in villages in the 
the materials, usually occur in the affected state or on the high seas, and the source state is a 
source only because the materials originated there and were loaded onto some mode of transport 
(rail, truck, or ship) there. See KATHARINA KUMMER, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTES: THE BASEL CONVENTION AND RELATED LEGAL RULES 15 ( 1995). 
3. See infra Part l.C. Even after Chernobyl, the most serious transboundary pollu-
tion incident in recent decades, there were no successful claims against the plant operator or the 
Soviet Union. See Gunther Hand!, Transboundary Nuclear Accidents: The Post-Chernobyl 
Multilateral Legislative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203, 223 (1988). 
4. U.N. Env't Programme [UNEP], Liability and Compensation Regimes Related to 
Environmental Damage 63 (2002) [hereinafter UNEP], http://www.unep.org/DEPI/programmes/ 
Liability-compen-papers.pdf. 
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Ivory Coast.5 The waste was off-loaded by a Greek-owned tanker flying 
a Panamanian flag and leased by the London branch of a Swiss trading 
corporation, Trafigura, whose physical headquarters are in the Netherlands.6 
The toxic sludge caused at least eight deaths and dozens of hospitaliza-
tions.7 With the existing barriers to international tort litigation, it is 
unlikely that injured villagers will receive any monetary compensation 
from culpable parties.8 
Surprisingly, international law scholars have largely overlooked the 
lack of ratifications of civil liability treaties and have instead engaged in 
micro-level analysis of individual treaties, examining design issues such 
as the choice between strict liability and fault-based liability, the types of 
environmental harm that should trigger liability, channeling of liabil-
ity to certain operators, and the implications of governmental permits for 
private liability.9 But expertly designed treaties have little relevance if 
they do not attract adherents, and only a handful of scholars have men-
tioned the lack of entry into force as a significant problem in this field 
of law. 10 The record of treaty failure should raise more fundamental 
5. See Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Global Sludge Ends in Tragedy for Ivory Coast, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at Al. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. In February 2007, Trafigura agreed to pay the government of the Ivory Coast $197 mil-
lion to obtain the release ofT rafigura executives who were seized inside the country after the dump-
ing incident. Trafigura did not acknowledge any liability under international law or the domestic 
law of the Ivory Coast, and it is not clear whether any of this money will reach the injured 
villagers. See Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Oil Company to Pay $200 Million in Toxic 
Dumping in Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at A6. 
9. See UNEP, supra note 4, at 44-61 (cataloging major soft-law and treary instruments 
relating to environmental liability and synthesizing their main features); Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, Apr. 2000, Civil Liability Resulting From Transfrontier Environmental 
Damage: A Case for the Hague Conference? 5-16, Preliminary Doc. 8 (prepared by Christophe 
Bernasconi), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.pdf [hereinafter Hague 
Conference] (cataloging treaties and outlining provisions); Betsy Baker Raben, Civil Liability as a 
Control Mechanism for Environmental Protection at the International Level, in INTERNATIONAL, 
REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 821, 825-43 (Fred L. Morrison & Rudiger 
Wolfrum eds., 2000); Alfonso Ascencio; The Transboundary Movement of Living Modified 
Organisms: Issues Relating to Liability and Compensation, 6 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L 
ENVTL. L. 293 ( 1997); Sam Blay & Julia Green, The Development of a Liability Annex to the Madrid 
Protocol, 25 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 1, 24 (1995); Michael Faure & Wang Hui, The International 
Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & !NT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (2003). 
10. See Robin Churchill, Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for 
Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 12 Y.B. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. 3, 41 (2001) (noting that the most "obvious" weakness of civil liability treaties is that 
"most [of the treaties] are not in force" or widely ratified); Anne Daniel, Civil Liability 
Regimes as a Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International 
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questions: What accounts for the problematic history of civil liability in 
the environmental field? Why are stronger tort remedies so often resisted 
by diverse groups of states? How can we establish more widely shared 
norms governing responsibility for international environmental harms? 
Departing from the narrower inquiries of prior legal literature, I 
address these questions through developing a macro-level model of how 
states negotiate over private law liability rules for environmental dam-
age. The model presented here adopts rationalist assumptions of state 
behavior and draws heavily on regime theory from political science.11 
The model illustrates the underlying interests of states in protecting 
their domestic constituents, the expected payoffs for states to cooperate 
on harmonized tort rules, and the reasons why this area of law has been 
characterized by frequent conflict. 
This Article is the first to model the dynamics of regime formation 
for environmental liability rules, as opposed to regime formation for con-
trolling ongoing pollution, which has been an occasional subject of prior 
regime theory literature and international law scholarship.12 This Article 
also explains why this field of law has been characterized by nonregimes 
rather than by successful instances of cooperation. 13 I present the 
overall ratification record of civil liability treaties, the breakdown of 
parties among developed and developing states, and new self-reporting 
by states regarding their reasons for nonratification. 
Based on my model, I conclude that there are three main reasons for 
the problematic record of tort liability in international environmental law. 
First, intense interest conflicts between developed states and developing 
Policy or False Comfort?, 12 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 225, 236 (2003) 
(noting that lack of entry into force "is the empirical reality that international policy makers 
must take into account"). 
11. Regime theory is the study of the conditions under which nations will cooperate to form 
regimes and the role of regimes once established, in shaping state behavior. See I. William Zartman, 
Negotiating the Rapids: The Dynamics of Regime Formation, in GETTING IT DONE: POST AGREEMENT 
NEGOTIATION AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 13, 19 (Bertman l. Spector & l. William 
Zartman eds., 2003) [hereinafter GETTING IT DoNE] (questioning whether "regimes shape state 
behavior, or [] states simply do what they can and want"); Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, 
Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491, 492 (1987) (addressing whether regimes 
"matter" as an "independent influence on state behavior"). 
12. See, e.g., Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahroranta, The Interest-Based Explanation of 
International Environmental Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 77 (1994). 
13. Radoslav Dimitrov defines "nonregime" as a "public policy arena characterized by 
the absence of an interstate policy agreement where states have either tried and failed to create 
one, or when governments have not even initiated negotiations." RADOSLAV S. DIMITROV, 
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: REGIMES AND NONREGIMES IN 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
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states with respect to liability rules have generated acrimony and distrust. 
Developed states, seeking to protect domestic firms and maintain liability 
walls, have been the primary opponents of new civil liability rules for 
transboundary environmental damage and have largely kept liability 
off the international environmental agenda. Second, multilateral discus-
sions on new liability rules involve high transaction costs associated 
with coordinating the interests and legal systems of dozens of states, yet 
transboundary environmental injuries, when they occur, usually involve 
two or perhaps only a handful of states. This asymmetry provides a 
powerful disincentive to harmonizing liability rules on an ex ante basis. 
Finally, adoption of civil liability rules has been frustrated by treaty 
provisions that are too onerous for states to accept. States have reported 
that high liability limits, difficulties in obtaining required insurance, and 
conflicts with domestic law have been severe obstacles to cooperation 
on negotiated tort remedies. 
How should we remedy the lack of remedies? The key question for 
proponents of strengthening the role of tort liability in international envi-
ronmental law is whether to continue to rely on treaty-based mechanisms 
for harmonizing domestic tort law or whether to strengthen liability 
principles outside the treaty process. I argue that a mix of treaty and 
non treaty strategies is needed. Treaty making should not be abandoned, 
but it should be reformed through layering of individual liability with 
compensation funds, and it should be conducted on a regional basis to 
facilitate regime formation. Outside the treaty context, we need to estab-
lish a clear norm that firms causing environmental damage across a 
border should not be able to use that border as a legal shield. Such a norm 
might emerge as a result of high-profile suits under existing domestic 
law, decisions of international tribunals, governmental pronouncements, 
or nonbinding declarations. The spread of human rights norms through 
a transnational legal process involving domestic and international 
actors can serve as a model for how rules for environmental liability might 
be established. 14 
14. This Article does not address a class of torts in which environmental harm occurs abroad, 
entirely within the borders of one country, and foreign plaintiffs sue a corporation in the United 
States on theories of veil piercing or operational control over a subsidiary. See generally XUE 
HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2003). Suits under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), related to environmental damage often fall under this 
category. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). Such suits have a transnational character, but there 
is no transboundary movement of pollution across borders, and these suits are not governed by the 
major treaties in the civil liability field. For an article that discusses global developments in this 
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I discuss the gap between 
states' rhetorical commitment to enhancing the role of tort in interna-
tional environmental law and what states have actually accomplished. 
Normatively, I argue that private law tort remedies should play a stronger 
role in international environmental governance, even as the primary 
response to international environmental problems must remain pre-
vention efforts grounded in public law. In Part II, I outline a theoretical 
model for how states negotiate over liability rules for transboundary 
environmental damage and then present, in more detail, the three prin-
cipal reasons for prior failures to establish private tort remedies through 
civil liability treaties. In Part III, I shift to a discussion of reform pro-
posals, showing the various treaty and nontreaty tools that should be 
deployed to enhance the role of tort in international environmental 
law in the future. 
I. TORT REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY 
In an era when international environmental law has become bureaucra-
tized through U.N. agencies, multilateral treaties, and massive diplomatic 
conferences, it is easy to overlook the centrality of liability and litigation in 
the origins of the field. In this Part, I trace the consistent international 
interest in tort remedies and explain why the international community has 
negotiated specific treaties to enhance tort remedies, rather than just relying 
on existing domestic legal procedures. I also outline the negotiation and 
ratification history of civil liability treaties, illustrating the persistent 
problems of regime formation that have plagued this area of law. 
A. International Interest in Tort Remedies forT ransboundary 
Environmental Damage 
Issues of compensation and redress were paramount in early interna-
tional environmental negotiations. Liability for environmental harm was 
a central concern of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, the founding text of international environmental law, which 
called on states to "co-operate to develop further the international law 
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and 
type of litigation, see Halina Ward, Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct 
Liability (Feb. 2001) (Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper No. 18). 
844 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 837 (2008) 
other environmental damage .... "15 Echoing the Stockholm Declaration, 
the 1992 Rio Declaration (adopted by consensus by more than 175 coun-
tries, including the United States) reiterated the need for states to coop-
erate "in an expeditious and more determined manner" to develop 
"international law regarding liability and compensation."16 Neither of 
these declarations specified whether stronger rules about financial liabil-
ity for environmental damage should be implemented through public 
law (holding states responsible) or private law (holding culpable private 
actors responsible through tort law). In practice, however, states have 
overwhelmingly turned to strengthening private international law reme-
dies. The impetus for private international law remedies often came from 
serious accidents, such as the Torrey Canyon oil spill in the North Sea in 
1967,17 and innumerable negotiations and discussions have occurred since 
the late 1960s to craft such remedies through treaty text. 18 Multilateral 
negotiations over private liability rules have occurred against an eco-
logical backdrop of pervasive transnational environmental externalities 
in areas such as air pollution, ocean contamination, hazardous waste ship-
ments, climate change, and the spread of invasive species and toxic 
chemicals. 19 Globalization has not only tied national economies together, 
it has also resulted in a web of exports and imports of environmental risks. 
As a result of consistent interest (particularly among developing states) 
in establishing stronger tort remedies for environmental harms, private law 
liability rules have become a key battleground of environmental diplo-
macy. Indeed, few international environmental agreements "can be 
negotiated today without running across the liability issue in one way 
or another."20 
15. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 22, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 (June 16, 1972). 
16. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 13, U.N. Doc. NCONF.151/26 (Vol. 
1) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
1 7. The Torrey Canyon accident was followed by the adoption, in 1969, of the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,973 U.N.T.S. 3. 
18. See Churchill, supra note 10, at 29-31 (listing treaties that call for the development of 
further liability regimes). 
19. See MARLA CONE, SILENT SNOW: THE SLOW POISONING OF THE ARCfiC (2005) 
(discussing the spread of toxic chemicals from North America and Europe to the native peoples 
of the Arctic); SPECIES INVASIONS: INSIGHTS INTO EcoLOGY, EVOLlJfiON AND BIOGEOGRAPHY 
(Dov F. Sax eta!. eds., 2005) (detailing the effects of the transcontinental spread of invasive species); 
Warren Cornwall, An Import From Asia: Bad Air, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at A1 (reporting 
on effects of Chinese air pollution on the northwestern United States). 
20. Brunnee, supra note 1, at 351. 
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What accounts for this consistent interest in developing stronger tort 
remedies? Tort has three major benefits for environmental governance. 
First, tort damages can provide pollution victims with compensation after 
major transboundary environmental accidents or pollution flows, such as 
oil spills on the high seas, chemical contamination of rivers or lakes, or 
industrial accidents that release toxins into the air. While governments 
may, in some cases, take criminal or regulatory action against culpable 
parties, tort provides a monetary remedy that can directly assist the vic-
tims of the pollution, and particularly victims who reside outside the 
jurisdiction where the harm originated. Moreover, tort could be a 
plaintiffs only resort against a polluting firm where state regulation of the 
firm's activities is weak or has been corrupted because of bribery or 
political influence. 21 
Second, more robust cross-border tort remedies could have a deterrent 
effect by forcing firms to internalize both the cost of any transboundary 
environmental damage and the cost of preventive measures. 22 Tort reme-
dies are an accountability mechanism to ensure a check on corporate con-
duct, to provide incentives to take precautionary measures, and to avoid 
"unjust enrichment" by companies that benefit from global economic activ-
ity while externalizing environmental consequences beyond national bor-
ders.23 It is not surprising that interest in enhancing private tort remedies 
for environmental damage developed in tandem with the growing interna-
tional acceptance of the polluter pays principle in the 1970s and 1980s.24 
Indeed, an effective tort remedy for pollution damages is the most con-
crete manifestation of the polluter pays principle. 
Third, tort law can act as a regulatory device by filling in gaps in the 
major public law environmental treaties. Existing treaties that govern 
shipments of hazardous waste, safety of nuclear reactors and industrial 
21. See PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 268 (2002). 
22. See Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is 
Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 408-D9 (2002) (summarizing benefits of tort 
litigation to address environmental damage, and noting that, in addition to compensation of 
the victim and specific deterrence of the culpable parry, tort awards will have a more general 
deterrent effect by sending price signals to other actors in the industry). But see Sanford E. 
Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments 
in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 324-29 (1989) (arguing 
that the goals of compensation and deterrence are often in conflict and questioning the value of 
liability in deterring and changing industry-wide practices). 
23. See Ascencio, supra note 9, at 295. 
24. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 21, at 92-93, 268; see also U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development, supra note 16, at princ. 16. 
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facilities, use of watercourses or regional seas, and other areas of environ-
mental cooperation might fail to prevent environmental damage for numer-
ous reasons. The damage may have been of a type unforeseen by the treaty 
negotiators, the treaty might contain weak initial commitments, there might 
be widespread noncompliance, or states may lack regulatory power, or fail 
to use their power, to control transboundary pollution originating in their 
borders. Treaties as a whole may be underenforced in an anarchic interna-
tional system that lacks an authoritative judicial organ.25 Tort liability, in 
theory, could remedy these weaknesses by providing private law avenues 
for compensation and redress. "In this way, private litigators contribute to 
[a] larger regulatory system, thereby producing a public good while pur-
suing their private aims." 26 
Reflecting this complementary function of tort law, most negotiations 
over civil liability rules for environmental damage have been conducted as 
a follow-up to negotiations on initial treaties that I will refer to in this Article 
as "primary" treaties. Primary treaties usually impose prospective obligations 
on governments to prevent environmental harm or manage shared resources, 
and they do not contain any private right of action to enforce their provisions 
or to seek damages. Primary treaties, in short, are regulatory treaties. 
Conventions setting baseline standards for nuclear safety or governmental 
informed-consent procedures for hazardous waste shipments are typical 
examples. Liability rules governing whom can be sued, the types of dam-
age that will trigger liability, and caps on damages are then negotiated as 
adjuncts to the primary treaty. These harmonized domestic tort rules thus 
establish private rights of action if environmental harm does occur. 27 
Liability rules should play a secondary, backup role to the primary 
treaties. Complex ecological problems cannot be addressed through tort 
alone, and solutions will require sustained cooperation among govern-
ments, additional funding, and new regulatory commitments. Prevention of 
harm should be the primary focus of international environmental law, and 
many environmental problems, such as long-range transport of air pollu-
tion, are not easily addressed through litigation. 28 
25. See generally Jon Hovi & lvar Areklett, Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and 
the Marrakesh Accords, 4 lNT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2004). 
26. Anderson, supra note 22, at 409. 
27. The relationship between liability rules and primary environmental treaties is discussed 
in more detail in Part Ill. 
28. See Phoebe Okowa, The Legacy of Trail Smelter in the Field of Transboundary Air 
Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION 198 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Millers eds., 2006) (noting the 
difficulty of establishing a causal nexus to specific sources where air pollution is regional). 
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Conceding the secondary role of liability in environmental govern-
ance does not eviscerate tort's continued importance, however. Har-
monizing tort law across jurisdictions for specific types of environmental 
damage has one very significant advantage in comparison to primary trea-
ties: Judgments in civil suits for transboundary environmental damage can 
be enforced by national courts, giving them real bite. National courts have 
a panoply of mechanisms at their disposal to enforce judgments and attach 
assets. 19 A civil liability treaty empowering national courts to address 
transboundary environmental damage therefore relies on existing sover-
eign authority for enforcement and implementation. Government-to-
government dispute resolution in primary treaties, in contrast, is notoriously 
cumbersome and lacks compulsory enforcement mechanisms. While many 
environmental treaties contain dispute resolution procedures, they have 
rarely been used in practice, and governments are unlikely to expend 
diplomatic capital on transboundary pollution cases ex post, except in 
extraordinary circumstances of major environmental damage.30 Tart 
remedies, on the other hand, do not require extensive governmental 
expenditures, other than creating the remedies in the first place and 
operating a court system to hear cases. As Peter Sand of the University of 
Munich put it: "Instead of internationalizing a local issue (via an enormous 
detour to the respective national capitals)," civil liability has the advan-
tage of "adapt[ing] local decision-making processes so that they can 
handle transfrontier problems like ordinary local ones of comparable size."31 
29. There is an extensive literature on the positive role that national courts can play in enforc-
ing international law. See, e.g., ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DoMESTIC 
COURTS (Benedetto Conforty & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997); INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); Karen 
Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501 
(2000); Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 
1397 (1999); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental 
Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47, 57-64 (1995). 
30. See Charles Phillips, Nordic Co-Operation for the Protection of the Environment Against 
Air Pollution and the Possibility of Transboundary Private Litigation, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR 
POLLUTION 153, 164 (C. Flinterman et a!. eds., 1986) (arguing that addressing transboundary 
pollution through public law mechanisms, "elevates the issue to the level of state responsibiliry 
where the question of whether a state's sovereignry has been invaded overshadows the inter-
ests of the individual in receiving adequate compensation."). 
31. Peter Sand, The Role of Domestic Procedures in Transnational Disputes, in LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 146 (H. van Edig ed., 1977), reprinted in TRANSNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LESSONS IN GLOBAL CHANGE 87, 97 (53 Int'l Law & Policy Series, 
1997). Even with resort to existing courts, we should not underestimate the transaction costs 
of bringing mass tort litigation. It is an expensive and lengthy process even in the best of 
circumstances. Gunther Hand!, International Accountability for Transboundary Harm Revisited: 
What Role for State Liability?, 37 ENVT'L POL. & L. 116, 119 (2007). 
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B. Liability Walls and the Pursuit of Negotiated Liability Regimes 
Why have states turned to specialized multilateral treaties to establish 
ton remedies for transboundary environmental damage? After all, if domes-
tic tort remedies are available for cases of domestic property damage or 
personal injury, then plaintiffs injured by transboundary pollution might 
simply rely on existing law and procedures in national courts (whether in 
their home state or in the source state) to vindicate their interests. 
Suits under domestic law for transboundary environmental damage 
have been exceedingly difficult to prosecute, however, due to robust and 
persistent procedural hurdles to transboundary tort litigation. The hurdles 
include obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign firms, extraterritorial 
service of process, the local action rule (which provides that actions in ton for 
damages to real property must be brought where the property is located),32 
resolving choice of law questions,33 overcoming motions to dismiss on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens, deciding whether a defendant's gov-
ernmental permit is relevant to its tort liability/4 and enforcing judg-
ments.35 For pollution that flows across borders, the locus delicti, or place 
of the tort, is often hotly disputed. Added to these legal barriers is the 
practical problem of the expense of bringing suit against a foreign entity and 
proving its negligence.36 For the 2.8 billion individuals living in developing 
countries on incomes of less than $2 per day,37 access to transnational tort 
remedies may, as a practical matter, be unattainable. 
Together, these legal hurdles form what I call a liability wall-a set 
of legal barriers that serves to insulate domestic firms from foreign suits over 
32. See Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 50-53. 
33. For a survey of different approaches to choice of law rules in transnational litigation, see 
Said Mahmoudi, Some Private International Law Aspects of Transboundary Environmental Disputes, 59 
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 128, 132-34 (1990). Courts have applied a variety of doctrines, including 
applying the law of the place where the wrongful act was committed, the place where the damage 
was suffered, or the so-called "center of gravity" or "most significant Ielationship" tests. Sand, supra 
note 31, at 120. Some European courts have adopted the principle of Gunstigkeits-Prinzip, or applying 
the state's law that is most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. 
34. See Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 40-44. 
35. If a plaintiff sues in his or her home court, where the environmental damage occurred, 
the state hosting the polluting industry may refuse to enforce the foreign judgment. XUE HANQIN, 
supra note 14, at 104-05. 
36. See Org. of Am. States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee w the 
General Assembly, 126--38, OEA Doc. OEA/Ser. Q/V1.34 CJI/doc.l45/03 (Aug. 29, 2003), available 
at http://www.oas.org/cji/eng/INFOANUAL.CJ1.2003.1NG.pdf. See also Hague Conference, supra 
note 9, at 40-44. 
37. See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Report Says New Democracies Falter, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
2002, at AS. 
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environmental damage. The impact of liability walls is severe: "Potential 
claimants are likely to be reluctant to sue in the unfamiliar and perhaps 
unfriendly courts of the actors causing the harm, and defendants will resist 
appearing in the courts of the victims."38 It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to detail all of these procedural barriers to transnational tort litiga-
tion, and other scholars have addressed these barriers at great length.39 
But prior scholarship has not connected the presence of liability walls to a 
state's incentive to ratify or not ratify a civil liability treaty, and I discuss 
these incentives in Part II. Moreover, scholars need to do more than iden-
tify the hurdles to transnational litigation: We need solutions for getting 
beyond liability walls. 
For present purposes, the important point is that the decentralized alter-
native of resting on domestic procedures has not proven to be satisfactory 
for strengthening tort remedies internationally.4° Consequently, states have 
repeatedly pursued the option of negotiating specific treaties that surmount 
liability walls through lowering barriers to tort suits. The resulting civil 
liability treaties are an unusual legal hybrid. They are negotiated among 
governments and are interpreted as public law treaties, but they are designed 
to establish and set the terms of liability for private actors.41 The ultimate 
implementation of the treaties is left to domestic courts. Civil liability for 
environmental damage therefore cannot be identified solely as an issue of 
international law or of domestic law-it is truly transnational. 42 
Broadly speaking, the civil liability treaties that have been adopted 
have three main functions. First, they ensure nondiscriminatory treatment 
of foreign plaintiffs and provide equal access to national procedures and 
38. John H. Knox, The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong 
Parties, and the Wrong Law, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS 
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 28, at 66, 68. 
39. See, e.g., Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 26--69; Anderson, supra note 22; Shi-Ling 
Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Utigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm: International Environmental 
Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 32-57 (2007); Sand, 
supra note 31. 
40. See THOMAS GEHRING, DYNAMIC INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: INSTITUTIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 15 (Martin Fi.ihr & Gerhard Roller eds., 1994) 
("[E]stablishment of international regimes is not a goal in itself. As long as decentralized and 
uncoordinated decision-making yields satisfactory outcomes, regimes will be of limited service."). 
41. See Gunther Hand! & Roberr E. Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of 
Hazardous Materials and Technologies, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 351,358 (1989). 
42. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 745, 
745 (2006). Koh quotes the definition of transnational law provided by Phillip jessup: "[A]ll law 
which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers ... [including] [b]oth public and 
private international law ... [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard cate-
gories." ld. 
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remedies for resolving tort disputes.43 Second, they address problems of 
jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of judgments by setting 
internationally agreed standards for where suits can be brought, which 
state's law will apply, and how judgments can be enforced through attach-
ment of assets or mutual recognition of judicial decrees.44 Third, the 
treaties harmonize the substance of liability law for suits arising out of 
activity covered by the treaty. All of the treaties have substantive provi-
sions regarding the standard of liability, limitations on damages, insurance 
requirements, defenses, and channeling of liability (the important issue of 
who can be sued). To establish the strict liability of industrial operators to 
set a monetary limit on claims, for example, a civil liability treaty may 
require parties to change their domestic liability law to reflect the harmo-
nized rules of the treaty.45 Harmonizing the substantive tort law helps to 
avoid conflicts of law problems for damages covered by the treaty. 
Imposing strict liability for transboundary environmental harm has 
become a default principle in civil liability negotiations. It is a starting 
assumption of negotiators and has been incorporated into all of the civil 
liability treaties adopted since 1989.46 An internationally agreed standard of 
strict liability for covered activities is probably the principal means through 
which a civil liability treaty could facilitate transnational litigation and 
improve a plaintiffs prospects for redress. 
43. See, e.g., Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999, U.N. 
Doc. UNEP/CHW.5/29 [hereinafter Basel Liability Protocol). 
44. See Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), art. 20, Oct. 10, 1989, U.N. 
Doc. ECE{fRANS/79, available at http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/cnd_e.doc 
[hereinafter CRTD Convention); Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy, art. 13d, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 263; International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 17, at art. X {providing that validly entered judgments enforce-
able under the law of the state of origin that are no longer subject to ordinary review are to be 
recognized by other parties if the first court had proper jurisdiction); International Convention 
on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection With the Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea, art. 40, May 3, 1996, IMD Doc. Leg./CONF. 10/8/2, 35 l.L.M. 1406 
(May 9, 1996) [hereinafter HNS Convention]. Most of the civil liability treaties have some 
provision for mutual recognition of judgments, subject to narrow exceptions such as judgments 
obtained by fraud or where enforcement would contravene clearly established public policy. For 
examples of these provisions, see LEFEBER, supra note 1, at 267 n.136. 
45. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 21, at 268--69. A treaty imposing strict liability would 
supersede (or require changes to) any domestic legislation that requires a plaintiff to prove fault. 
In addition to the widespread application of strict liability, many of the treaties also harmonize 
domestic liability law by imposing joint and several liability in situations where more than one 
party is culpable. Id. 
46. Churchill, supra note 10, at 34. 
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Fourteen major civil liability treaties have been adopted in the envi-
ronmental field since 1960, and the particular kind of damage covered 
by each treaty varies widely.47 "Environmental damage" usually includes 
traditional injuries to health or property caused by long-term flows of 
pollution or by sudden accidents. It also includes, in some of the newer 
civil liability treaties, categories such as economic loss due to contamina-
tion (for example, fishermen's loss of catch after an oil spill), the cost 
of protective measures to prevent further damage to resources after a pol-
lution incident occurs, and the cost of restoring damaged resources. 48 
The treaties that have been completed to date are highly sectoral, 
targeting specific industrial or transport activities such as transport of cer-
tain regulated hazardous substances by road or rail, transport of hazardous 
wastes by ship, or industrial accidents on transboundary watercourses. This 
narrow targeting can leave wide gaps in coverage for many types of envi-
ronmental damage. Injuries from transport of hazardous waste in inter-
national commerce are addressed by the Basel Liability Protocol,49 for 
example, whereas an accident from improper management of hazardous 
waste near a border may not be covered by any treaty. Human error caus-
ing a landslide or flood that crosses a border would likely not be covered 
by any of the civil liability treaties. While the sectoral nature of the treaties 
has clear drawbacks, states have simply been unwilling to agree on more 
generalized principles of liability for trans boundary environmental damage. 5° 
4 7. See treaties listed infra tbl.l. 
48. There is still considerable controversy over whether civil liability treaties should apply to 
damage to the global commons (such as the high seas) or to ecological damage unrelated to property 
values (such as destruction of wetlands on private property where the loss of wetlands has no 
impact on the market value of the property). For a fuller discussion, see LEFEBER, supra note 1, at 9; 
Anderson, supra note 22, at 410 (Tort litigation is "downright clumsy and inflexible in making 
awards for environmental goods and processes outside the market."); Brian Jones, Deterring, 
Compensating, and Remedying Environmental Damage: The Contribution of Tort Liability, in HARM 
TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 11, 
17-19 (Peter Wetterstein ed., 1997). 
49. See Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43. 
50. The treaty that comes closest to doing so, the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability 
for Damage Resulting From Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 l.L.M. 
1228, a regional treaty adopted by the Council of Europe, has not attracted any ratifications in fif-
teen years. See A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and 
International Law, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 16 (2005) (discussing reasons for the lack of success of the 
Lugano Convention). 
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C. The Problematic Track Record of Civil Liability Treaties 
Despite decades of efforts, civil liability treaties have rarely entered 
into force and have therefore foundered as vehicles to establish viable 
remedies for transboundary environmental damage. Given the consistent 
rhetorical commitment to enhance liability rules and the numerous efforts 
to negotiate liability treaties, the lack of actual accomplishments in this 
area of law is striking and deserves further investigation. As positive law, the 
treaties have been largely impotent, with a negligible impact on 
resolving actual disputes. 
Table 1 brings together years of data on negotiations, ratifications, and 
entry into force of civil liability treaties. The first column in Table 1 pro-
vides the name of the treaty. The second column in Table 1 provides the 
year of adoption-when the treaty text was agreed to by negotiators, usu-
ally by consensus, and opened for signature.51 The third column in Table 
1 indicates the number of signatures on the treaty since adoption. Signature 
on a treaty authenticates the treaty text as the final text that was adopted 
and indicates the support of the signer, such as a foreign minister or head of 
state, but signature alone usually does not signify a state's consent to be 
bound by the terms of the treaty.52 The fourth column in Table 1 shows the 
number of ratifications of the treaty. Through ratification, a state formally 
declares its intention to be bound by the terms of the treaty upon entry into 
force of that treaty.53 In many states, ratification cannot proceed until 
domestic procedures for approving treaties have been satisfied, such as 
the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the Senate in the United States. 
Frequently, a signatory state may choose not to become a ratifying party 
h 54 to t e treaty. 
Finally, the last two columns in Table 1 indicate the relationship 
between ratification and entry into force, which is the point at which the 
treaty imposes binding obligations on all parties who have ratified. The civil 
51. The process of adopting, signing, and ratifying treaties is governed by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 9-18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Entry into force is governed by Article 24. See id. at art. 24. 
For a narrative overview of these steps, see HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 305--09 (2007). 
52. See HUNTER, SALZMAN &ZAELKE, supra note 51, at 306. Under the Vienna Convention, 
signature on a treaty obligates the state to refrain from acts "which would defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty." 
Vienna Convention, supra note 51, art. 18. 
53. A ratifying state usually deposits a document stating that intention with the United 
Nations or the treaty secretariat, thereby becoming a formal party to the treaty. 
54. See infra Part II.B. 
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liability treaties in Table 1 all provide that entry into force occurs upon 
some minimum number of ratifications. 
As Table 1 illustrates, most of the treaties have not received sufficient 
ratifications to enter into force. Of the fourteen major civil liability treaties 
listed in Table 1, only six have entered into force, and these six were all in 
the fields of liability for oil spills and nuclear accidents. The repeated 
attempts to negotiate liability treaties in other fields have been a clear 
failure, leaving a yawning gap in coverage.55 
55. See Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 15. 
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TABLE 1: STATUS OF CiVIL LIABILITY TREATIES ADOPTED SINCE 196056 
Ratifications Entry Year of Number of Number of Necessary for Treaty Adoption Signatures Ratifications Entry Into Into 
Force Force 
Paris Convention 
on Third Party 
Liability in the 1960 18 15 5 1968 
Field of Nuclear 
Energy 
•Amending 1964 16 14 5 1968 protocol 
•Amending 1982 14 11 5 1991 protocol 
•Amending Not 
protocol 2004 16 0 5 in 
Force 
Supplementary 1963 16 12 6 1974 Convention 
•Amending 
1964 13 12 6 1974 protocol 
•Amending 1982 14 11 6 1988 protocol 
•Amending Not 
protocol 2004 13 0 6 in 
Force 
Convention on Not the Liability of 1962 16 6 2 in Operators of Force Nuclear Shij2S 
IAEA Vienna 
Convention on 
Civil Liability 1963 14 33 5 2003 
for Nuclear 
Damage 
•Amending 1997 15 5 5 2003 
rotocol 
56. Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, Can., May 25-27, 2005, Status of Third-
Party Liability Treaties and Analysis of Difficulties Facing Their Entry Into Force, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/CBD//BS/WG-L&R/1/INF/3 (Apr. 15, 2005), avaikzble at https://www.biodiv.org/doc/ 
meetings/bs/bswglr-01/information/bswglr-01-inf-03-en.pdf [hereinafter Convention on Biological 
Diversiry]. Ratifications for oil pollution damage treaties compiled from "The International Regime 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage" {January 2008), avaikzble at http://www.iopcfund.org/ 
npdf/genE.pdf. Information on the number of ratifications necessary for entry into force was 
compiled from the treaty texts. 
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Ratifications Entry Year of Number of Number of Necessary for Treaty Adoption Signatures Ratifications Entry Into Into 
Force Force 
IAEA Convention 5 states with 
a minimum 
on 





for Oil Pollution 
Damage 








Caused During Not 
Carriage of 1989 2 5 in 
Dangerous Force 
Goods by Road, 
Rail and Inland 
Navigation 
Vessels 
IMO International 10 states, 
Convention on including4 
Civil Liability states with 
for Oil Pollution 1992 10 122 more than 1996 
Damage one million 
(replaced 1969 units of gross 
Convention) tonnage 
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• Protocol 2003 3 21 8 2005 
Council of Europe 
Lugano 




on Liability & 12 states, 
Compensation including 4 
in Connection states that Not 
with Carriage 1996 8 8 have at least in 
of Hazardous two million Force 
and Noxious units of gross 
Substances tonnage 
by Sea 
Basel Protocol on 
Liabiliry and 
Compensation 
for Damage Not 
Resulting From 1999 13 8 20 in 
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Ratifications Entry Year of Number of Number of Necessary for Treaty Adoption Signatures Ratifications Entry Into Into 
Force Force 
IMO International 18 states, 
Convention on including 5 
Civil Liability states with 
for Bunker Oil 2001 3 18 gross tonnage 2008 
Pollution not less than 












As is clear from Table 1, the enormous diplomatic energy expended in 
various international fora over close to four decades has resulted in only 
a handful of operational agreements. "Getting to yes" (completing nego-
tiations on a treaty text), has only rarely led to "getting it done" (bringing 
the treaty to life through entry into force and implementation through 
domestic legislation).57 As Alan Boyle of the University of Edinburgh 
put it, understatedly, "[l]ack of participation is a problem with most of 
the liability schemes; at best it casts some doubt on their acceptability 
or relevance."58 
Table 1 illustrates just a portion of the overall problem with civil 
liability treaties. It does not capture the instances where a civil liability 
treaty is in force, but the most important states-the ones hosting the 
targeted activities-have not ratified it. For example, major nuclear states 
such as the United States, Canada, South Korea, and Japan have all refused 
57. Bertram I. Spector, Deconstntcting the Negotiations of Regime Dynamics, in GmiNG IT 
DoNE, supra note 11, at 51, 55. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GITfiNG TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN ( 1991 ). 
58. Boyle, supra note 50, at 16. 
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to ratify the nuclear liability conventions.59 No industrialized states have 
ratified the major civil liability treaties governing shipments of hazardous 
waste and cargo-the Basel Liability Protocol and the Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances (HNS) Convention. 
Table 1 also does not capture situations where negotiations on tort 
liability rules began but never came to fruition, or where liability negotia-
tions never even commenced even though such negotiations were explicitly 
called for in another international convention. There are over a dozen 
examples of treaties that call for future liability negotiations that were 
never followed by achievement of a liability agreement.60 
In the existing literature on civil liability in international environ-
mental law, scholars have rarely mentioned the poor ratification record of 
civil liability treaties and have not paid sufficient attention to the implica-
tions of this poor record for future attempts at treaty negotiation.61 Indeed, 
59. See lnt'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA), Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage, (Apr. 20, 2007), available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/ 
liability_status.pdf. 
60. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of 
the Wider Caribbean Region, art. XIV, Mar. 24, 1983, 1506 U.N.T.S. 157, available at 
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/cartxt.html ("The Contracting Parties shall co-operate with 
a view to adopting appropriate rules and procedures ... in the field of liability and compensation for 
damage resulting from pollution of the Convention area."); Convention for the Protection of the 
Natural Resources of the South Pacific Region, art. 20, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (stating that 
parties to the convention shall cooperate in the adoption of rules and procedures concerning liabil-
ity and compensation for damage resulting from pollution); Convention on the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, art. 17, Mar. 22, 1974, 1507 U.N.T.S. 167 ("The 
Contracting Parties undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to develop and accept rules concern-
ing responsibility for damage resulting from acts or omissions in contravention of the present 
Convention, including, inter alia, limits of responsibility, criteria and procedures for the 
determination of liability and available remedies."); United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, art. 235(3), Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. NCONF.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) ("States shall 
cooperate in the implementation of existing international law and the further development of intema-
tionallaw relating to responsibility and liability [and) criteria and procedures for payment of adequate 
compensation .... "). See also LEFEBER, supra note 1, at 4 n.8 (gathering treaties and declarations 
that call for further discussions on liability and redress). 
61. See, e.g., Robert Cleton, The CRTD Convention on Civil Liability and Compensation, in 
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 205, 218 (Ralph P. Kroner ed., 
1993) (describing the provisions of the treaty in detail and noting that "it is not very likely that the 
Convention will enter into force within the foreseeable future"); KUMMER, supra note 2, at 239 
(summarizing the main features of civil liability treaties, outlining their strengths and weaknesses, 
and explaining that few of the treaties have ever entered into force); Blay & Green, supra note 9, at 
25, 36 (outlining liability issues related to environmental damage in Antarctica, noting in passing 
that a "speedy conclusion of a liability regime [is) rather unlikely"); Michael Tsimplis, Liability and 
Compensation in the International Transport of Hazardous Wastes by Sea: The 1999 Protocol 
to the Basel Convention, 16 [NT'L j. MARINE & COASTAL L. 295, 334 (2001) (calling the lack of 
entry into force of the Basel Liability Protocol "sobering," after a forty page discussion of its con-
tents and requirements). 
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the Basel Liability Protocol has often been described as a model for the 
future, even though it has not entered into force nine years after its ini-
. 1 d . 62 tta a optton. 
Given the record to date, it is time to shift gears and move away 
from the detailed discussions about how to structure civil liability trea-
ties, and instead examine what has precluded mutual cooperation on civil 
liability treaties in the past and what the alternatives are for the future. 
Continuation of the prior patterns of negotiations will not be fruitful, and 
may very well be counterproductive. As Anne Daniel, a Canadian envi-
ronmental negotiator, has written, "a continuing series of sectoral liability 
treaties could simply result in implementation overload that could challenge 
even the most robust national legal systems."63 
II. TORT'S TUMULT: ANALYZING THE CAUSES OF FAILURE 
Dissecting the reasons for past failures in the civil liability field requires 
delving into the dynamics of how and why nations cooperate (or refuse to 
cooperate) in international affairs. In this Part, I develop a model at the 
intersection of international law and international relations theory that 
illustrates how states negotiate over liability rules for transboundary 
environmental damage. The model helps to explain past conflicts, especially 
those between developed states and developing states, and shows how 
liability negotiations differ from other types of environmental negotiations. 
This Part presents the model and three conclusions about the under-
lying causes of the problematic history of civil liability in international 
environmental law. 
My model is grounded in regime theory-the study of the formation, 
dissolution, and consequences of international regimes. Numerous defi-
nitions of a regime have been provided in the literature. The most 
commonly cited definition is Stephen Krasner's: A regime is a set of 
"implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area 
62. At the time of negotiations, the Basel Liability Protocol was widely seen as "breaking new 
ground" on the international law of compensation and liability. Paola Bettelli et al., Summary of the 
Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal: 6-10 December 1999, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Dec. 13, 
1999, at 1, 13, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2006e.pdf. See also Brunnee, supra 
note 1, at 361 ("[T]he protocol has begun to serve as a model for other agreements."). 
63. Daniel, supra note 10, at 236. 
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of international relations."64 Krasner's definition could capture informal 
arrangements and understandings as regimes, such as the cooperation among 
allies over time. However, in the highly legalistic civil liability field, it 
makes sense to view the point at which a treaty enters into force, thereby 
imposing binding legal obligations, as the objective measure of when a regime 
has formed.65 To reflect that civil liability is based on the complex coor-
dination of legal institutions through treaties, I adopt the definition of the 
international relations scholar Radoslav Dimitrov: A regime is a "formal 
intergovernmental policy agreement that involves specific commitments 
to policy targets ... and has entered into force according to the terms of 
h l l ,66 t e ega text. 
Regime theory was developed in the late 1970s and 1980s by political 
scientists such as Krasner, Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, Duncan Snidal, 
Kenneth Oye, and Oran Young. That period saw the proliferation of 
international institutions in the fields of security, trade, environment, and 
development. Regime theorists sought to explain the basis and function of 
that multilateral cooperation, even as the dominant political dynamic 
remained the bipolar conflict of the Cold War.67 With this intellectual 
orientation, most regime theory literature has focused on successful examples 
of institution building. Here, I use the tools of regime theory to explain 
nonregimes, or situations where states have consistently tried, but failed, to 
build cooperative institutions.68 Nonregimes, which are as much a result of 
collective political decisions as successful regimes, are important to study 
in order to understand the conditions under which countries will cooperate 
h . . l l 69 to ac 1eve env1ronmenta goa s. 
Most regime theorists are rationalists-they assume that states are self-
interested unitary actors seeking to secure their interests in an anarchic 
64. Haggard & Simmons, supra note 11, at 493; see also id. at 493-96 (reviewing defini-
tions of "regime"). 
65. See Bertram I. Spector & Anna R. Korula, Problems of Ratifying International 
Environmental Agreements: Overcoming Initial Obswcles in the Post-Agreement Negotiation Process, 3 
GLOBAL ENvrL. CHANGE 369, 372 (1993) (explaining that while countries sometimes comply with 
treaty language without formal ratification, ratification is the more usual practice and provides a 
verifiable measure of states' support for a treaty). 
66. See OIMITROV, supra note 13, at 5. 
67. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2624-26 (1997) (book review). 
68. See DIMITROV, supra note 13, at 9; see also Radoslav S. Oimitrov et a!., International 
Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 lNT'L STUDIES REV. 230 (2007). 
69. Cf. Dimitrov eta!., supra note 68, at 232. 
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international system.70 Regime theory is rooted in neoliberalism, and its 
adherents believe that states act to maximize their absolute gains, rather 
than their relative gains in relation to other states. Regime theorists 
argue that cooperation is possible and common in the international sys-
tem and that international institutions (formal or informal) can shape and 
modify state behavior over extended periods of time, even when powerful 
states object to the institution. 71 
A basic tenet of regime theory is that "interests determine regimes.'.n 
In other words, states seek to form regimes where cooperative arrange-
ments will serve their overlapping interests in a way that states could not 
achieve acting alone. Think of the role of NATO, for example, in serving 
the combined interests of the United States, Canada, and Western 
European nations in countering the Soviet threat. Even where interests 
converge, however, regime formation is not inevitable because coopera-
tion can be derailed through strategic behavior, miscommunication, or 
incentives to defect or free-ride. 73 
A. Two Models of Environmental Liability Negotiations 
With this focus on underlying interests in mind, I develop a model of 
how negotiations occur over new liability rules in two subparts. I first sketch 
a "Basic Model" of how two states negotiate over ongoing cross-border 
pollution emissions. This kind of bilateral model has dominated both 
political science scholarship and legal scholarship on the dynamics of 
transboundary pollution to date. I then make important modifications to 
the Basic Model to develop an "Extended Model" that captures the 
peculiarities and nuances of pollution liability negotiations, which carry 
70. See GEHRING, supra note 40, at 23-24; Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International 
Regimes, 36 INT'L ORO. 325, 335 (1982) (assuming that states are rational utility maximizers "in that 
they display consistent tendencies to adjust to external changes in ways that are calculated to 
increase the expected value of outcomes to them"). 
71. See Oran R. Young, The Politics of International Regime Fannation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment, 43 INT'LORG. 349,350 (1989); Zartman, supra note 11, at 20. 
72. ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 48 (1990); see also Zartman, supra note 11, at 31. 
73. See Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in 
COOPERA':'ION UNDER ANARCHY 1, 7-8 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) {laying out the incentives 
of the two prisoners in the classic prisoners' dilemma game and showing how the rational decisions of 
each can produce a sub-optimal outcome for both); see also ORAN B. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226 
(Cornell Stud. in Pol. Econ., 1989) ("Despite the existence of a distinct zone of agreement, the 
parties may well fail to reach agreement ... as a result of strategic misrepresentations .... "). 
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more uncertainties, involve more parties, and address risks that may not 
occur until years after the negotiations. 
1. The Basic Model 
In the Basic Model, State A is emitting damaging levels of pollu-
tion across its border into State B, and State B demands a formal 
intergovernmental meeting to negotiate an agreement on halting the 
pollution. State B can point to abundant law to mount its case. The 
Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration, and numerous other soft-law 
instruments prescribe that no state may use its territory to cause envi-
ronmental damage in the territory of another state. 74 The most famous 
of all international environmental law cases, the Trail Smelter arbitral deci-
sion of 1941/5 would likely support State B's claims of legal injury. 76 
Despite all the legal instruments supporting State B, regime theory 
would model this negotiation as "deadlock," where one actor always pre-
fers mutual defection (noncooperation) to mutual cooperation,77 and the 
transboundary pollution would likely continue. No pollution control treaty 
is likely to be concluded in this setting because State A, the source state, 
gains from externalizing pollution to State B, the affected state. With 
directly opposed interests, State A will always face a negative payoff from 
forming a control regime. The Basic Model demonstrates that transbound-
ary pollution often results in a kind of "victim pays" dynamic in which 
74. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 15, princ. 21; U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 16, princ. 2. 
75. (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. lnt'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941). 
76. The Trail Smelter decision was the first to clearly enunciate the principle that no state 
may use its territory in such a manner as to cause environmental injury in another state. See id. The 
tribunal found Canada in violation of international law because of damage in the United States 
caused by Canadian sulfur emissions. See id. Whether this principle today constitutes customary 
international law is a matter of considerable debate. See, e.g., Karin Mickelson, Rereading 
Trail Smelter, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 28, at 79 (arguing that the unusual circumstances of the Trail Smelter 
arbitration limit its precedential value); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary 
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 951-54 (1997) (discussing the relationship between Trail Smelter 
and subsequent development of the soft law of transboundary pollution); David A. Wirth, 
Teaching and Research in International Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 423, 436 
( 1999) (noting the lack of state practice to refrain from transboundary pollution out of a sense 
of legal obligation). 
77. As Kenneth Oye has noted, in a game of deadlock "conflictual outcomes follow ... directly 
and simply from the payoff structure." Oye, supra note 73, at 7. No amount of policy coordination 
or trust-building activities can alter the basic underlying divergence of incentives. Id. at 6-7. 
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the source state has no incentive to cooperate on abating the pollution 
absent some compensation from the victim. 78 
International law scholars often couch their analysis of transboundary 
pollution problems in terms of the Basic Model. For example, Thomas 
Merrill of Columbia Law School modeled a bilateral, state-to-state conflict 
in one of the most significant American law review articles on the dynam-
ics of transboundary pollution. 79 According to Merrill, transboundary 
pollution is a public-law, state-centered conflict, in which a plaintiff state 
and a defendant state are the relevant parties. He suggests principles to 
guide the states in presenting their contesting claims in negotiations or before 
a tribunal, "much like an appellate argument."80 
The Basic Model is insufficient, however, to explain the nuances of civil 
liability negotiations. It assumes that a state, as an entity, is the party that is 
causing the pollution, and that another state is suffering the effects of the 
pollution. It thereby obscures the true nature of transboundary pollution 
dynamics, where industrial firms or transporters are usually the sources of 
pollution and private parties are the victims. National governments pro-
vide the political setting for such conflicts, but the long-standing interest 
in civil liability rules demonstrates that states are looking to private dispute 
resolution among directly affected parties as a solution to the conflict. 
2. The Extended Model 
The Basic Model needs to be extended to capture how states might 
negotiate over a treaty establishing private liability rules for transboundary 
pollution, as opposed to a treaty aimed at reducing emission levels. To show 
how the presence of liability walls, introduced in Part I, affects state 
incentives to ratify a civil liability treaty, I develop in this subpart an 
Extended Model that has two major components: 
78. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 751-52 (1999) (arguing that the polluter pays principle cannot be 
implemented in an international system of voluntary assent to treaties because "polluters will simply 
decline to participate in a regime that imposes net costs on them"). 
79. See Merrill, supra note 76. 
80. Id. at 1008--09. Merrill recommends that trans boundary pollution should be handled on a 
case-by-case basis, after environmental damage occurs, through application of two "golden rules" of 
reciprocity whose content will vary depending on the states involved. The golden rule is "do unto 
other states as you do to your own citizens," and the reverse golden rule is "do not ask of other states 
what you do not ask of your own citizens." Id. at 998. Before an international tribunal or in bilateral 
negotiations, a state could propose a decision rule (related to the standard of liability, limits on 
damages, or procedural protections) that is no more favorable than the way that state treats its own 
citizens or industries in a similar context. Id. at 1007-08. 
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First, the Extended Model identifies domestic constituents as the true 
party-in-interest in the negotiations and shows how states act to promote the 
interests of their domestic firms and/or citizens. For example, states with a 
large number of firms capable of causing transboundary environmental 
damage would be the most resistant to agree to civil liability treaties that 
could lower liability walls and expose those firms to suit. 
Second, the Extended Model multilateralizes the Basic Model by 
introducing multiple parties and multidirectional pollution flows. The 
multilateral Extended Model suggests that there are heightened transaction 
costs to regime formation due to the large number of parties at the bargain-
ing table, and it also suggests that states can be both source states and affected 
states, depending on the type of environmental damage being targeted by a 
liability treaty. 
I will discuss each of these components of the Extended Model in tum. 
First, any model of liability negotiations must capture the role of domestic 
constituents because civil liability negotiations involve states negotiating 
over the interests of their domestic firms and/or citizens (for example, the 
interests of XYZ Corporation that owns the emitting factory in State A 
or the interests of the residents of Big City in State B that are affected by the 
pollution). Although tort itself is retrospective and compensatory, a nego-
tiation over harmonizing tort rules for environmental damage can be viewed 
as a battle between states over which prospective legal rules, decision 
procedures, liability limits, and insurance obligations will most benefit 
their domestic constituents. The Basic Model misses this nuance by posit-
ing that states themselves are both the source of harm and the relevant 
injured party. 
Regime theorists rarely delve into the black box of domestic politics,81 
but it is essential to do so in order to understand the causes of past failures 
of regime formation. A negotiation over a new liability treaty is a two-level 
game in which governments aim to "win" on both the international plane 
(vis-a-vis other states) and on the domestic plane (by negotiating 
arrangements that benefit powerful domestic interests). 82 Actions that 
are rational on the international plane (including, perhaps, agreeing with 
a close ally on civil liability rules) may be impossible for decisionmakers to 
take because of domestic constraints. A "win-set" is the set of treaty 
81. See Haggard & Simmons, supra note 11, at 513. 
82. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 
42 INT'LORG. 427,434 (1988). 
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provtstons or policies achievable on the international plane that are also 
acceptable and ratifiable at the domestic level. 83 
How do states serve their domestic constituents in a negotiation over 
liability rules? The primary interest of a rational source state is minimizing 
the risk that domestic firms will get sued for damages related to their 
externalized pollution. Liability walls are therefore crucial to under-
standing state incentives vis-a-vis civil liability treaties. States hosting 
polluting firms that externalize pollution across borders are likely to be 
opposed to new liability rules for environmental damage and are likely to 
be strongly wedded to the legal status quo, with its numerous procedural 
hurdles to transnational tort litigation for environmental damage. Long-
standing rules of private international law governing jurisdiction, choice 
of law, and enforcement of judgments create a defensive bulwark that 
benefits risk-externalizing domestic firms in a source state. A rational 
affected state-that is, a state on the receiving end of transboundary 
pollution flows-has the opposite incentive: to support a civil liability 
treaty as a means to lower liability walls and to ensure that its citizens have 
improved avenues for redress and compensation in the event of substan-
tial environmental damage. The Extended Model therefore predicts a high 
degree of conflict among states over liability treaties, depending on the 
interests of their domestic constituents in relation to liability walls. 
The second component of the Extended Model recognizes that liabil-
ity negotiations are usually multilateral and involve pollution flows or 
pollution risks that are multidirectional. The countries involved in these 
negotiations are rarely solely source states or solely affected states, as in 
the Basic Model, but rather can be identified as both, depending on the 
types of activities or pollution involved. Most countries contribute to 
trans boundary environmental damage (even to a small extent or in a diffuse 
manner) and are affected by transboundary pollution from other states. 
I use a two-by-two grid, shown in Table 2, to capture the multidi-
mensional aspects of liability negotiations.84 Here, a state's negotiating 
position on a civil liability treaty is a function of two factors: ( 1) the 
domestic economic prevalence of the activity targeted by the civil liabil-
ity treaty (because of the state's interest in protecting firms from 
transnational tort suits), and (2) the state's ecological exposure to harm 
83. Id. at 435-36. 
84. This two-by-two grid is based on a model developed by Detlef Sprinz and Tapani 
Vaahtoranta, which they applied to European negotiations over transport of pollutants that cause 
acid rain, as well as to global negotiations over control of ozone-depleting substances. See Sprinz & 
Vaahtoranta, supra note 12. 
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from foreign firms engaging in the targeted acttvtty (because of the 
state's interest in ensuring that its citizens can sue foreign firms causing 
transboundary environmental damage). 
TABLE 2: STATE POSITIONS IN RELATION TO A HYPOTHETICAL CIVIL 
LIABILITY ThEA TY 
Ecological Exposure 




Domestic Economic Prevalence 








Category I states are the bystanders-states that do not suffer any 
major harm from the type of transboundary pollution targeted by a civil 
liability treaty and that do not have major economic dependence on indus~ 
tries that pose transboundary environmental risks. With little to win or 
lose from a treaty, they are likely to abstain from negotiations on civil 
liability treaties or offer only lukewarm support. Category II states are likely 
to be strong opponents because, in lowering liability walls, a civil liability 
treaty may threaten important domestic industries. Category III states, in 
contrast, are likely to be supporters of a civil liability treaty. They are 
frequently exposed to ecological risks from cross~border pollution, yet they 
do not have a high degree of economic dependence on activities that create 
cross-border environmental damage. As in the Basic Model, the Extended 
Model still predicts intense conflict between category II states and category 
III states over the terms of any civil liability treaty. 
What about category IV states? They have a high degree of economic 
involvement in activities that might be targeted by a civil liability treaty as 
well as a high degree of ecological exposure to cross~border environmental 
damage. Category IV states are labeled likely opponents because of the 
probable dynamics of public choice within their national capitals. Industry 
opponents of a civil liability treaty would argue vociferously against adop~ 
tion of a treaty, and industry lobbies probably have a larger influence on state 
negotiating postures compared to the political influence of diffuse groups of 
individuals who may be exposed to transboundary pollution. Individuals 
usually do not know, ex ante, whether they will be victims of trans boundary 
environmental damage, and therefore, in both developed and developing 
states, they have little incentive to lobby in support of a treaty. 
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Table 2 illuminates negotiating dynamics in a variety of civil liability 
contexts. Instead of assuming that states are either source states or affected 
states related merely through bilateral flows of pollution, Table 2 shows 
how state interests regarding a potential civil liability treaty are shaped as a 
function of competing factors of geography, ecological exposure, and the 
intensity of economic activity. It also highlights the prominence of domes-
tic considerations in structuring negotiating postures. 
B. Using the Extended Model to Identify the Causes of Regime Failure 
The more nuanced perspective of the Extended Model helps to illu-
minate three persistent causes of regime failure in the civil liability field: 
( 1) interest conflicts between developed states and developing states; ( 2) high 
transaction costs to adopt and implement treaties, combined with low 
expected payoffs; and (3) incorporation of treaty provisions that are too oner-
ous for states to accept. 
1. Interest Conflicts Between Developed States and Developing States 
The Extended Model is similar to the Basic Model in one crucial 
respect: it still predicts underlying patterns of conflict in negotiations over 
new civil liability treaties (especially between the category II states and 
category III states in Table 2). Given these conflicting interests in relation 
to liability walls, the basic prediction of deadlock in the Basic Model also 
holds in the Extended Model. There will be no "demand for regimes',ss unless 
some incentive can be provided to induce the participation of states that 
view themselves as net losers in a more harmonized system of tort liabil-
ity rules for environmental damage. 86 
There are undoubtedly many developing nations that fall into cate-
gory II for particular treaties. For example, they may be net exporters of 
pollution to other states, with a high degree of dependence on the industries 
causing the pollution. But the most prominent cleavage in past negotia-
tions has been a split between developed states and developing states. 
Since the 1972 Stockholm conference, developed countries have been 
the most consistent and vocal opponents of civil liability regimes. Because 
the goal in establishing a civil liability regime is to "remove obstacles to 
85. See Keohane, supra note 70, at 337. 
86. Oran Young has argued that regime formation is unlikely under these circumstances 
because of the absence of a clear "contractarian environment" in which all parties can see joint gains 
from devising new institutional arrangements. See Young, supra note 71, at 367. 
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transboundary litigation and in certain cases to ensure that liability stan~ 
dards are harmonized and an effective remedy guaranteed," it is not sur~ 
prising that industrialized states have refused, in large numbers, to sign 
and ratify the treaties. 87 Developed states are likely to be concentrated in 
category II, with strong interests in maintaining liability walls due to their 
concentration of large firms capable of causing environmental damage 
across borders. 
Developing states, in contrast, have been the primary advocates of 
negotiating new civil liability treaties.88 Developing states have favored 
harmonized liability rules and the imposition of strict liability as means to 
lower liability walls and thereby enhance avenues for compensation and 
redress against foreign firms.89 Developing states are likely to be concen~ 
trated in categories I and Ill in Table 2. Because tort law provides a means 
to shift the costs of harms back onto the culpable party, internationally 
agreed~upon liability rules, from the perspective of developing states, are 
an attractive means of correcting global power imbalances, redressing 
historical inequities, and assisting their citizens. Indeed, developing state 
negotiating positions on civil liability treaties have been closely inter~ 
twined with larger grievances, such as the lack of accountability of 
multinational corporations operating in poor countries and the wide 
disparities in wealth that undergird international shipments of hazardous 
wastes to the developing world.90 
The conflicts between developed and developing states with respect 
to liability rules are therefore not just over interests (how domestic 
constituents in each set of states will fare under various liability regimes), 
87. Sand, supra note 31, at 97. 
88. See Brunnee, supra note 1, at 360 (discussing the Basel Liability Protocol and noting that 
because the underlying Basel Convention was designed to "ensure safe transfers of hazardous waste 
from developed countries to recipient countries in the South, it is not surprising that many of the 
negotiating issues pitted developed against developing countries."). 
89. See id. at 362. According to Brunnee, in negotiations over liability rules for the 
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, developed countries opposed an enabling clause that would lead to 
subsequent discussions on liability for environmental damage from living modified organisms 
(LMOs). See id. Developing countries, in contrast, "were concerned at their limited capacity 
for risk assessment and risk management. They saw a liability regime as essential to their protection 
against the risks of transboundary movements of living, genetically modified organisms." Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
90. See Daniel, supra note 10, at 236 ("Developing countries have a strong interest in the 
development of liability regimes as a method of protection against the activities of multinational 
corporations. While some developed countries have been supportive of liabiliry regimes ... develop-
ing countries were the driving force .... ") (emphasis omitted); see also Gino J. Naldi, The 
Regulation of the Transnational Trade in Hazardous Wastes-The African Response, 7 S. AFR.j. 
ENvrL L. & POL'Y 213 (2000). 
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but also over power (who will exercise control over the international 
environmental agenda). The power disparities between developed and 
developing nations help to explain why liability rules have so frequently 
been pushed off negotiating agendas and relegated to subsequent protocols 
that have slim chance of adoption. 
The negotiations in 1998 and 1999 over a treaty regulating inter-
national shipments of genetically altered seeds and plant tissues, known as 
living modified organisms (LMOs), are an example of how the conflicts 
within the Extended Model play out in practice. Significant conflict 
emerged between developed states that are major biotech exporters 
(including the United States, Canada, and Australia) and over 120 
developing states present at the negotiation. Developing states, under 
the leadership of Worku Damena of Ethiopia, pushed to get tort liabil-
ity rules includt:d in the initial text of a treaty on LMOs because they were 
concerned about ecological damage in developing countries, where LMOs 
were being heavily marketed by biotech companies based in the developed 
world.91 The United States and a handful of other biotechnology exporters 
opposed including any tort liability provisions in the treaty text. Faced 
with this opposition, and not wanting to derail the entire treaty, the 
developing nations were forced to postpone the liability discussions to a 
later date. 92 According to delegate Damena: 
The negotiations on liability and redress were particularly chilly, as 
there was a stunned silence from the delegates of the industrialized 
countries every time the issue was raised. It was perhaps the only issue 
in which the industrialized countries invariably showed their lack of 
interest and successfully stalled the talks, repeating that the issue is a 
complex one . . . . I found it difficult to understand why some of these 
states opposed rules on liability and redress when they already had 
tough laws at the domestic level. The developed countries' sincerity 
about providing an adequate safety regime for a new technology to 
91. Ecological concerns related to LMOs include gene contamination of native crops, 
resistance of target pests, increased use of chemical pesticides, and toxicity of LMOs for animals. See 
Helmut Gaugitsch, Scientific Aspects of the Biosafety Debate, in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON 
BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
83 (Christoph Bail et al. eds., 2002). 
92. See Worku Damena, Liability and Redress, in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON 
BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 91, at 369 ("[By the end of 1998], I had come to accept that it would be difficult to 
forestall the inclusion in the protocol of an enabling clause in preference to a substantive one 
because of the industrialized countries' overwhelming opposition to my position."). 
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which they are subjecting the developing world was suggested by their 
bleak position on liability and redress.93 
Similar negotiating dynamics were noted by Kate Cook, a delegate to 
the negotiations who was then legal advisor to the U.K.'s Department of 
Environment, Transport, and the Regions. According to Cook, developing 
countries consistently expounded "the message that if this subject [liability 
for LMO releases] were to be left out, the prospects for successfully finaliz~ 
ing a protocol would be minimal."94 In contrast, she observed, developed 
country opposition to liability rules stemmed from their concern that "sig~ 
nificant resources would be diverted into a complex and time~consuming 
exercise for which there was not, as yet, any demonstrable need[.]"95 
According to Cook, the source of the split between developed and 
developing nations was differing "perception[s] of how well their own 
countries would be able to cope with the consequences of any incident that 
might occur in the future. Thus developing countries generally supported 
the inclusion of liability, while most developed countries were opposed .... "96 
Developed states have not uniformly opposed all civil liability treaties, 
however. Developed states have for the most part adhered to and imple~ 
men ted the regimes governing oil spill liability and nuclear liability. One 
factor that led to the relative success of the oil spill liability regime was that 
oil shipments have long been conducted under rules set by international 
conventions. The International Maritime Organization oversees a series of 
treaties governing accident prevention, design of tankers, and emergency 
response procedures. Addressing liability for environmental damage from 
oil spills through an international convention therefore was not viewed as 
a radical departure from existing precedent. Moreover, the formation of an 
oil pollution liability regime was greatly facilitated by the prior existence 
of well~developed insurance markets for oil shipments and a relative pre~ 
dictability in the amount and frequency of damages, due to decades of 
experience with oil shipping. Prior to the adoption of the 1969 oil 
spill liability convention, the oil shipping industry had already agreed, 
through contract, to similar liability provisions.97 In the case of the nuclear 
93. ld. at 368. 
94. Kate Cook, Liability: 'No Liability, No Protocol', in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON 
BIOSAFETY, RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 92, at 371,372. 
95. Id. at 373. 
96. ld. 
97. See Tank Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution 
(TOVALOP), Jan. 7, 1969, 8I.L.M. 498 (1969). 
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liability regime, governments in developed nations were eager to adopt a 
treaty that assigned liability solely to nuclear plant operators so as to 
preclude suits against governments themselves, which were the primary 
suppliers of nuclear raw materials. 98 
Developed states also likely supported the oil spill and nuclear acci-
dent liability regimes to promote the underlying activities of oil shipments 
and nuclear power generation. Civil liability treaties that lower barriers 
to transboundary tort suits can, in addition to helping potential victims, 
serve to encourage and facilitate the targeted activity. This can occur by 
providing financial certainty to private operators through damage caps 
(limiting the liability exposure of tanker owners and nuclear plant opera-
tors), and it can also occur by overcoming political opposition to new 
technologies by creating legal remedies in the case of accidents. 
This encouragement function provides some incentive for host 
states-those with economic reliance on the underlying activity-to ratify 
a civil liability treaty. As Alan Boyle has said, international harmoniza-
tion of liability law establishes "a more equitable balance between the 
interests of plaintiffs and defendants," helping to create "shared expectations 
on a regional or global basis which may make the risks posed by hazardous 
activities more socially acceptable to those likely to be affected."99 
The nature of the risks in the oil spill and nuclear liability contexts 
also likely contributed to support from developed states. In both cases, the 
damages from accidents can affect several countries, and there is no easy 
calculus to be made in advance of a treaty regarding who will be a source 
state and who will be an affected state. Shipments of oil are widespread 
across oceans and within river systems, and many countries are exposed to 
some risk of damage from spills. In the nuclear context, radiation plumes 
can travel thousands of miles, as evidenced by the Chernobyl accident, so 
even host states of nuclear reactors face a strong possibility of major 
ecological damage from foreign nuclear reactors. As Oran Young has noted, 
if a state "cannot know in advance whether [it] will occupy the role of site 
of an accident, victim state, or unharmed bystander with respect to specific 
98. See Giinther D:Jeker & Thomas Gehring, Private ar International liability far Transnational 
Environmental Damage-The Precedent of Conventional Liability Regimes, 2 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 10 
(1990) (arguing that the primary goal of the Vienna Convention was not compensation of victims, 
but rather was "regulat[ing) the international law of liability for transnational nuclear damage 
according to the need for unhampered technological development"). 
99. Boyle, supra note 50, at 12. 
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accidents," then there is a strong incentive to "consider the common good 
in devising institutional arrangements. "100 
Outside these two contexts, however, the ratification record of civil 
liability treaties shows a sharp divergence between developed and develop-
ing states, as predicted by the Extended Model and Table 2. The pattern 
that has emerged is that small numbers of developing countries have signed 
and ratified civil liability treaties, but in insufficient numbers to bring the 
treaties into force. In many cases, developing states that have little domes-
tic dependence on the economic activity being regulated (category I or III 
states) are the only states willing to ratify the treaties and become formal 
parties. In contrast, developed states, defined here as the members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/01 
have on occasion signed civil liability treaties, but they generally have not 
become formal parties through ratification or accession. Table 3 shows this 
recurring pattern in some of the civil liability treaties adopted since 1989. 
TABLE 3: SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO SELECTED 
CiVIL LiABILITY TREATIES ADOPTED SINCE 1989 
Treaty Name 
UNECE Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Caused 
During Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by 
Road, Rail and Inland 




100. Young, supra note 71, at 367. 




101. The Members of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United 
States. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649 _201185_1889402_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2008). 
102. Supra note 44; see CRID Convention, Participants, http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/ 
publi/crtd/status.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
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Treaty Name 
Convention on Liabiliry 
and Compensation 
in Connection with 
Carriage of Hazardous 
and Noxious Substances 
by Sea (1996) 103 
Basel Protocol on Liabiliry 
and Compensation 
for Damage Resulting 
from T ransboundary 
Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes (1999) 104 
873 
Signatory States Ratifying or Acceding 
States 
OECD: Canada, Denmark, OECD: None 
Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
Non-OECD: None Non-OECD: Angola, 
Cyprus, Morocco, 
Russian Federation, 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Samoa, 
Slovenia, Tonga 











of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Liberia, Republic 
of Congo, Syria, T ago 
103. Supra note 44; see Status of the HNS Convention, http://www.hnsconvention.org/ 
en/status.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). 
104. Supra note 43; see Basel Convention, Parties to the Basel Liability Protocol, 




on Civil Liability 
for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage 
(2001 )105 
Protocol on Civil Liability 
and Compensation 
for Damage Caused 
by the T ransboundary Effects 
of Industrial Accidents 
on Transboundary Waters 
(2003) 
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Signatory States 
OECD: Canada, Australia, 
Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Non-OECD: Brazil 
OECD: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
Non-OECD: Armenia, 
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 



















The Extended Model suggests that developed states would normally 
oppose such treaties to protect domestic firms. Why, then, would many 
developed states sign but not ratify these agreements, rather than just oppose 
them outright? 
The pattern of OECD states signing, but not ratifying, these con-
ventions is quite striking. It has not been previously noted in literature 
on civil liability treaties. There are two possible explanations for the 
behavior of developed states. Either there was a post-signature breakdown 
in support for civil liability treaties, or there was little support to begin with 
105. See TRANSPORT CAN., MARITIME LAW REFORM DISCUSSION PAPER 15 n.12 (May 
2005), http://www.tc.gc.ca/poVen/report/tp14370/tp14370e.pdf (listing signatories and parties). See 
also lnt'l Mar. Org., Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the 
International Maritime Organization ar Its Secretary-General Performs Depository ar Other Functions, Dec. 
31, 2005, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14 7 44/9193.pdf. 
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and developed states signed these civil liability treaties for symbolic rea~ 
sons, with no intent to ratify and become formal parties. 
Literature on "post~agreement negotiation" suggests that both explana~ 
tions are plausible. Post~agreement negotiation is the "dynamic and 
cooperative processes, systems, procedures, and structures that are institu~ 
tionalized to sustain dialogue on issues that cannot, by their very nature, 
be resolved by a single agreement."106 The post~agreement negotiation 
literature views an initial treaty text as just a starting point for a 
decades~ long process of subsequent negotiations, in both the domestic and 
international spheres, concerning treaty ratification, interpretation, 
implementation, and revision. 107 Gaining domestic support for ratification 
of the treaty is just one step in this process,108 and conflicts can arise at any 
stage of the post~agreement negotiation that can lead to overt or covert 
defections from prior cooperative relationships. 
There are four principal reasons why a state may decline to ratify a treaty 
after initially signing it: ( 1) treaty~specific factors, such as emerging domes~ 
tic opposition to the content of the treaty; (2) extraneous factors, such as 
other issues that gain a higher legislative priority; (3) process elements, such 
as public pressure or the degree of personal involvement by national leaders 
in pushing for ratification; and ( 4) status elements, such as the nature of the 
domestic political process, the level of economic development, and public 
spending in the issue area. 109 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail the mechanisms of the 
post~signature breakdown in support for various liability treaties. But it seems 
plausible that national leaders in developed states may have signed civil 
liability treaties for purely symbolic value (for example, to pay off domes~ 
tic constituencies or to claim credit for action on an environmental issue), 
with no intention of ever becoming a formal party to the treaty. 
In other cases, a head of state or foreign minister in an OECD country 
may have genuinely supported a civil liability treaty, but opposition may 
have emerged over time in that state due to the complicated nature of 
multilevel bargaining games identified by Robert Putnam and other regime 
theorists. For example, after treaty signing, the approaching need to pass 
106. Spector, supra note 57, at 55 (emphasis omitted). 
107. See Zartman, supra note 11, at 25-26 ("The process of regime formation does not stop 
with adoption of a founding agreement .... [t]he idea of an ultimate instrument governed thereafter 
by pacta servanda sunt is a notion of a bygone era."); see also Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of 
Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1829 (2003). 
108. See Spector & Korula, supra note 65, at 372. 
109. Id. 
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implementing legislation may have ignited the opposition of domestic 
legislators or industry lobby groups who were not involved in the ini-
tial treaty negotiating process.ll0 It is also possible that elections and 
changes in political control may have led to reversals in a state's initial 
support for a civil liability treaty. In the United States, for example, the 
Bush Administration repudiated both the Kyoto Protocolll 1 and the Rome 
Statute creating the International Criminal Court after the Clinton 
Administration had signed both conventions. 112 That some developed 
states may have initially signed a civil liability treaty does not under-
mine the Extended Model's predictions. The significant point is that 
in the end, large numbers of developed states have concluded that it is 
not in their interests to ratify the treaties and become formal parties. 
2. High Transaction Costs and Low Expected Payoffs 
Extending the bilateral Basic Model through introduction of the more 
realistic setting of multilateral negotiations in the Extended Model helps to 
illuminate a second major obstacle to regime formation in the civil liability 
field. This obstacle is the high transaction costs of negotiating and imple-
menting agreements, coupled with the relatively low expected benefits. 
On the cost side, the Basic Model fails to capture the significant 
transaction costs of negotiating multilateral liability treaties. In the bilateral 
110. Spector and Korula have argued that new players involved in the domestic ratification 
process can outmaneuver government officials who initially supported and signed a treaty: 
Negotiators representing their countries before an international forum may be sufficiently 
flexible to reach an agreement. &.!t stakeholders back home (such as ministry bureaucrats, 
political parties, business, unions, citizen lobbies, etc.) may be much more hard-nosed 
and tough as internal domestic negotiators, responsible for approving and implementing the 
product of international negotiation. 
Id. at 372-73 (emphasis omitted). 
111. Vice President AI Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of the United States in 
November 1998, even though it was clear at the time that there was not a two-thirds Senate major-
ity in favor of the treaty. See SCOTI BARRE1T, ENVIRONMENT AND STA TECRAFf: THE STRATEGY 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 370 (2003). The outcome in the Senate was fairly certain 
because of the passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which passed by a 95-0 vote. See S. Res. 98, 
105th Cong. (1997) (stating the sense of the Senate that the United States should not be a signatory 
to any climate treary that did not include binding targets and timetables for developing as well as 
industrialized nations or that "would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States"). 
112. The Clinton Administration signed the treaty establishing the International Criminal 
Court in December 2000. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Rarify International 
Criminal Court Treaty, AM. Soc'Y lNT'L L., May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007). Id. President Clinton explained that the treaty had "significant 
flaws," but that "[w]ith signature ... we will be in a position to influence the evolution of the 
court." Id. The Bush Administration quickly signaled its opposition to the treaty, citing a number 
of objections. See id. 
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setting of the Basic Model, we have seen that the source state has little 
incentive to curtail pollution that is damaging the affected state, absent some 
form of compensation. This is certainly a roadblock to regime formation, 
but it is theoretically surmountable. The bilateral setting of the Basic 
Model raises the possibility of Coasian bargaining113 in which the affected 
state could offer some form of payment to the source state to install 
pollution controls on its emitting facilities. 
In contrast, consider the Extended Model, where there are dozens of 
states attempting to negotiate a civil liability treaty, with complicated 
pollution flows among numerous states and states acting as both source 
states and affected states, depending on the type of pollution involved or 
the time period in which the treaty is negotiated. The prospects for 
Coasian bargains in this setting are dramatically diminished. 
As Kenneth Oye and other regime theorists have noted, increasing the 
numbers of parties involved in negotiations tends to raise the cost of regime 
formation by making it difficult to find a satisfactory zone of agreement 
among states and by raising the chance that parties will defect from an 
agreement once formed. 114 "[A]nalytic constructs closely tied to a two-party 
view of the world ... cannot carry us far in coming to terms with the poli-
tics of international regime formation."ll 5 
With respect to civil liability treaties, dozens of parties are usually at 
the table to negotiate the terms and conditions of liability rules. Some of the 
liability treaties negotiated to date have been designed to be global,116 while 
others are regional treaties that nevertheless encompass twenty or more 
. l . ll7 Th' "1 b " bl . h potentia parties. ts creates a arge num ers pro em wtt respect to 
the transaction costs of negotiating the treaties.ll8 
113. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). Coase argued 
that private parties involved in a pollution or nuisance dispute will bargain over abatement, and that 
in the absence of transaction costs, they will reach the economically efficient result. Id. Similar 
bargaining could occur among states if the transactions costs are low. 
114. See Oye, supra note 73, at 19. 
115. Young, supra note 71, at 360. 
116. Examples of global treaties include the Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, negotiated 
as a follow up to the global Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and the HNS Convention, supra note 44, which was 
negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. 
117. The CRTD Convention, supra note 44, for example, was negotiated under the auspices 
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, which has fifty-six member countries located in 
Europe and Central Asia. See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Eur., Member Countries, http://www.unece.org} 
oes/member_countries/member_countries.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2007). 
118. See Merrill, supra note 76, at 984-85. 
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On the benefit side, multilateral liability treaties have a "small numbers" 
problem that also serves as a barrier to regime formation. 119 Any one party 
considering joining a liability regime has only a small risk of having its 
citizens victimized by the specific forms of transboundary pollution covered 
by that treaty. That party may reject the prospect of a lengthy negotiation 
for a multilateral treaty if it perceives only marginal benefits for its own 
citizens from joining a regime. As Thomas Merrill has noted: 
[M)ost transboundary pollution problems are perceived as being rela-
tively isolated and localized disputes. People tend to focus on this 
particular transboundary air pollution problem or that particular 
transboundary water pollution problem; the ones they focus 
on, of course, are the ones that have an immediate impact on 
them . . . . Only if people and nation-states come to view each 
individual transboundary dispute as just an example of a more 
generic phenomenon that affects nearly everyone (including 
themselves) are we likely [to] see significant support for a general-
ized regime of regulation of transboundary pollution .... lZ0 
It is not only the number of parties in the Extended Model that hin-
ders regime formation, but also the uncertainties inherent in the rules being 
negotiated. Liability negotiations involve more uncertainty compared to 
regimes controlling transboundary emissions of pollutants, as in the Basic 
Model, because there are no easily verifiable technological fixes that can be 
mandated in a liability treaty and because liability treaties concern new tort 
rules that will apply to future polluting activity or accidents. In most cases 
(such as nuclear accidents or ecological damage from release of LMOs), the 
probability of the event that triggers liability, the magnitude of the resulting 
damage, and the prospect of a monetary recovery for injured victims pur-
suant to a treaty are all highly uncertain. 
In theory, if states operate under a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance,"121 with 
uncertainty about who will ultimately pay tort judgments and about the 
frequency of suits and amounts of damages, the prospects for contractualist 
regime formation could increase. States may soften negotiating positions, 
for example, if they are not sure how their own firms will fare under a new 
civil liability regime. According to Oran Young, such a veil lengthens the 
"shadow of the future" and "has the effect of increasing interest in the 
formation of arrangements that can be justified on the grounds that they 
119. See id. 
120. Id. 
121. ]OHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118--23 (1971). 
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are fair in procedural terms."122 Indeed, Young argues that states are often 
uncertain about what their own preferences are, especially, in the beginning 
stages of treaty negotiation. This makes achievement of rough equity, rather 
than Pareto optimality or maximization of individual self-interest, the 
f . 123 paramount concern o negottators. 
It is more likely, however, that the uncertainty inherent in negotiat-
ing over prospective liability rules has the opposite effect of hardening 
negotiating positions and complicating calculations of the benefits of join-
ing a treaty. For an affected state concerned about its exposure to a 
transboundary harm, the benefit of joining a civil liability treaty may not 
be realized until transboundary damage occurs and a claim for compensa-
tion for injured citizens is adjudicated. Treaty-based tort rules are written 
broadly, and the details of their implementation are left to national legal 
systems. 124 Civil liability treaties are therefore subject to delayed defections, 
in which evidence that a party is noncooperative might not emerge until 
future events trigger liability and actual suits are brought. The inability 
to monitor cooperation in the near term is likely a serious disincentive to 
forming a regime in the first place. Under emissions control treaties, in 
contrast, it is usually easier to verify in the near term whether a state is 
actually implementing required control measures through installation of 
new technology or changes in industry practices. So even if we assume that 
a group of states has underlying common interests in a more harmonized tort 
regime for transboundary environmental damage, states within the group 
might still find cooperation to be risky because "[t]he actor following a 
cooperative strategy is vulnerable to losses inflicted by defecting partners."125 
3. Treaty Content as a Cause of Regime Failure 
The third major reason for the persistent failure to establish viable ton 
remedies in international environmental law is that the content of civil 
liability treaties themselves has often been too onerous and objectionable 
for large groups of states to adopt. The Extended Model highlights the 
primacy of protecting domestic constituents, and it appears that many states, 
122. 0RAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A 
STATELESS SOCIETY 43 (1994). 
123. See id. 
124. See, e.g., Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 19. 
125. Christer Jonsson, Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics, in REGIME THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 202, 205 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993). 
880 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 837 (2008) 
concerned about the domestic impact of the treaties, have decided in their 
game-theoretical calculus that it is better not to play the game at all. 
Below, I argue that the deep obligations of civil liability treaties, such 
as requirements to change domestic liability law and the threat of enforce-
able monetary judgments, have been a barrier to forming tort liability 
regimes, and I compare the depth of obligations of civil liability treaties to 
other major treaties in international environmental law. Here, I leave the 
theoretical predictions of the Extended Model to examine self-reporting 
by states on their reasons for nonratification. Drawing on these self-reports, 
I conclude that high liability limits, lack of available insurance, and conflicts 
with domestic legal systems have been frequent barriers to regime formation 
in the civil liability field. 
a. The Depth of Civil Liability Treaties 
Conflicts between developed and developing states permeate most 
areas of international environmental law/26 so scholars of the role of tort in 
international environmental law are confronted with a puzzling question: 
Why has the international community been able to bridge these conflicts 
in negotiating primary treaties, but not in negotiating associated liability 
rules? As noted briefly in Part I, liability rules for environmental damage 
have traditionally been negotiated as adjuncts to a broader primary treaty 
that establishes nonliability obligations in the same field of law. The pri-
mary treaties establish governmental obligations to prevent environmental 
damage, and the associated liability treaties establish the rights and remedies 
of private actors if environmental damage nonetheless occurs. The primary 
treaties have generally been far more successful in terms of attracting sup-
port. Table 4 shows this relationship for several recent civil liability treaties. 
126. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental 
taw, 76 TUL. L. REV. 843 (2002); Adil Najam, The View From the South: Developing Countries in 
Global Environmenral Politics, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND POLICY 225 
(Regina S. Axelrod eta!. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
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TABLE 4: PRIMARY ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES AND ASSOCIATED LIABILITY RULES 
Primary Treaty Purpose Parties Associated Parties Liability Treaty 
U.N. Convention on Requires parties to 14 
the Law of the Non- protect, preserve, 
Navigational Uses and manage the 
of International quality of 
Watercourses international 
(1997) 127 watercourses under 
the principle of Protocol on Civil 
"equitable and Liability and 
reasonable Compensation 
utilization." for Damage 
and Caused by the 
T ransboundary 
Convention on the Encourages parties to 36 Effects of 
T ransboundary provide assistance Industrial 
Effects of Industrial in the event of an Accidents on 
Accidents industrial accident T ransboundary 
(1992)128 with transboundary Waters (2003) 
effects, to cooperate 
on research and 
development, 
and to share 
information and 
technology. 
Basel Convention Establishes informed 168 Basel Protocol on 8 
on the Control consent procedures Liability and 
ofT ransboundary for shipments Compensation 
Movements of wastes, provides (1999) 
of Hazardous Wastes that wastes must 
and Their Disposal be managed in an 
(1989)129 environmentally 
sound manner, 
and provides for 
penalties in the 
event of illegal 
shi ments. 
12 7. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
May 21, 1997, 36l.L.M. 700. 
128. Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17, 1992, 
UN/E/ECE/1268, 31l.L.M. 1330 (1992). 
129. Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43. 
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Primary Treaty Purpose Parties Associated Parties Liability Treaty 
Cartagena Protocol Establishes informed 139 Potential N/A 
on Biosafety consent procedures liability 
(2000) 130 among governments protocol or 
for trans boundary amendment 
shipments of (under 
Living Modified discussion 
Organisms. since 2000) 
As shown in Table 4, many states have bifurcated their support by 
ratifying a primary convention but declining to ratify the convention's 
associated liability rules. The Basel Convention is the most notable example. 
It has been ratified by 168 states (including all the OECD member states 
except South Korea and the United States) and entered into force in 1992, 
while its associated liability protocol has been ratified by only eight states 
and has not entered into force. By postponing discussion of tort liability 
rules to a subsequent agreement or protocol, parties to the underlying pri-
mary treaty undoubtedly have an easier time reaching consensus on the 
initial issues of governmental coordination, but the postponement is usually 
fatal for the liability rules. 131 Removing the teeth from the initial nego-
tiation only serves to sharpen the bite of the liability discussions. 
The most likely reason for this difference in support between primary 
treaties and liability rules is the difference in the depth of the obligations 
imposed. Primary treaties often contain shallow commitments with which 
states can easily comply. 132 Commitments might include record keeping, 
monitoring, reporting, consultation, and adherence to broad principles, such 
as the principle of "equitable and reasonable utilization" of shared waterways 
in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses.133 Primary treaties usually contain rudimentary 
dispute resolution procedures and weak or nonexistent enforcement mecha-
nisms. In many cases, they impose requirements with which states have 
130. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000). 
131. See Brunnee, supra note 1, at 359 (noting that primary treaties have often "deliber-
ately side-step[ped] responsibility or liability issues, emphasizing instead various strategies to 
promote compliance"). 
132. See David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global 
Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVfL. L. & POL'Y F. 147, 152 (1999). 
133. Supra note 127, arts. 5-6. 
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already complied individually.134 From the perspective of regime forma-
tion, then, the negotiation process for primary treaties is often "a joint 
effort to discover an agreement marked by harmony or simple coordina-
tion. Unsurprisingly, many agreements result, participation in those agree-
ments is high, the lowest common denominator reigns, and compliance 
. 1 .c ul35 ts near y penect. 
George Downs and colleagues have defined a treaty's depth as "the 
extent to which [the treaty] requires states to depart from what they would 
have done in its absence."136 The substantive obligations of the liability 
treaties tend to be deep because the treaties raise the prospect of higher 
insurance premiums, enforceable tort judgments, and multimillion dollar 
damage awards against domestic firms. The operation of domestic court 
systems, after all, is one of the core aspects of national sovereignty. Deep 
treaties, involving substantial infringements on sovereignty and national 
freedom of action, are rare in international environmental law. Sover-
eignty is jealously guarded, and once an ecological problem is identified, 
states are in most cases inclined to adopt modest programs with high 
symbolic value: 
Especially in liberal democracies, where public opinion is both fickle 
and essential to political survival, governments are constantly on the 
prowl for actions that have low short-term costs and high symbolic 
value. When under pressure to deal with an international environ-
mental problem that could have high short-term costs and distant 
international benefits, politicians are politically wise to sidestep by 
signing a treaty that is superficially significant but actually requires 
little action. 137 
The substantive obligations in civil liability treaties clearly go beyond 
mere symbolism. As new liability treaties have been proposed and negotiated 
over the past few decades, a kind of default model for a civil liability treaty 
has emerged that is quite stringent. The model is designed to implement the 
134. See Victor, supra note 132, at 153 (noting that the United States was a major supporter of 
the London Dumping Convention of 1972, which banned ocean dumping of radioactive wastes, 
because the United States had already passed national legislation to that effect). 
135. Id. at 155-56; see also Merrill, supra note 76, at 974 (noting that many international 
negotiations are "aligned interest" situations, where "if some mechanism can be devised for induc-
ing mutual cooperation, the situation is potentially a positive-sum game for all"). 
136. See George W. Downs et a!., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, SO lNT'L ORO. 379, 383 (1996). For a treaty that required reductions in pollution 
levels or in tariffs, for example, the treaty's depth would refer "to the reduction it required relative 
to the counterfactual estimate of the tariff or pollution level that would exist in the absence of a 
treaty." Id. 
13 7. Victor, supra note 132, at 154. 
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polluter pays principle by establishing a high limit of financial liability, 
mandating insurance coverage up to the limit of liability, and providing for 
strict liability of operators for environmental damage. 138 All of the recent 
civil liability treaties have incorporated these provisions. 139 But the attrac-
tions of implementing broader tort remedies for transboundary envi-
ronmental damage are precisely the features that make regime formation 
so difficult, as these deep features of civil liability treaties would be expected 
to generate intense opposition from some states. Indeed, since 2000, new 
data has become available that suggest that the default model of recent civil 
liability treaties is not acceptable to large groups of states in both the devel-
oped and the developing worlds. 
b. Self-Reporting by States on Reasons for Nonratification 
The new data on reasons for nonratification are contained in answers 
submitted by numerous states to questionnaires distributed between 2000 
and 2006 by treaty secretariats for the Basel Liability Protocol, the Lugano 
Convention, and the CRTD Convention. The secretariats, concerned 
about the slow pace of ratification and the lack of support for the civil 
liability treaties they are charged with overseeing, posed specific ques-
tions about the reasons for nonratification and about domestic liability law 
and insurance mechanisms. 140 Questionnaires were distributed to signa-
tories of each convention and to nonsignatories that were members of a rele-
vant governing body, such as the Inland Transport Committee of the 
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe in the case of the CRTD Convention.141 
In a public document, of course, states may not reveal their true 
motivations for nonratification. Because of this possibility, and the brevity 
138. See Churchill, supra note 10, at 32-40 (outlining the components of the default model). 
139. See, e.g., Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at arts. 4, 14, Annex B; CRTD 
Convention, supra note 44, at arts. 5, 9. 
140. For a list of questions asked, see Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous 
Goods, Geneva, Switz., May 7-11, 2001, Follow up of the Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation 
Vessels (CRTD), U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17 (Feb. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wpl52001-17e.pdf; Basel Liability Protocol, 
Workshops, Questionnaire 1, http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops {last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007). 
141. The secretariat for the Basel Liability Protocol convened a series of workshops in 
Argentina, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Poland to bring states together to discuss 
their reasons for nonratification of that civil liability treaty. Basel Liability Protocol, Regional 
Workshops Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability and 
Compensation, [hereinafter Regional Workshops], http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops 
{last visited Nov. 3, 2007). 
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and diversity of responses, I have not attempted a statistical analysis of all 
the responses. But the responses do illustrate what states (or certain bureauc-
racies) choose to reveal about their motivations. 
The responses reveal that the two most common objections to the 
treaties were: (1) the limits of liability in the treaties are too high, and ( 2} 
there are no insurance products available domestically that could cover the 
high limits of liability. These two objections are closely linked because most 
of the recent civil liability treaties mandate that operators of the targeted 
activity obtain insurance coverage up to the relevant liability limit. 142 Table 
5 gives some examples of liability limits in recent treaties. SDR refers to 
Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund. 143 
142. The Basel Liability Protocol, for example, requires that strict liability for damage must be 
covered by "insurance, bonds or other financial guarantees" for amounts at least equal to liability 
caps in the treaty. Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at an. 14; see also Michael Tsimplis, 
Liability and Compensation in the International Transport of Hazardous Wastes by Sea: The 1999 
Protocol w the Basel Convention, 16 INT'L). MARINE & COASTAL L., 295, 321 (June 2001). 
143. The conversion from SDR to U.S. dollars is provided on the IMF's web site: International 
Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). 
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TABLE 5: LIABILITY LIMITS IN RECENT CIVIL LIABILITY TREATIES 
Treaty 
CRTD Convention (1989) 
Lugano Convention on Civil Liability 
for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment (1993) 
HNS Convention (1996) 
Basel Liability Protocol (1999) 
Protocol on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Damage Caused 
by the T ransboundary Effects 
of Industrial Accidents on 
T ransboundary Waters ( 2003) 
Liability Limit 
Accidents caused by road or rail carriers: 
SDR 18 million ($27.18 million) 
Accidents caused by inland navigation vessels: 
SDR 8 million ($12.01 million)144 
No liability limit specified 
Small ships: SDR 10 million ($15.1 million) 
Large ships: SDR 100 million ($151 million)145 
Upper liability limit: none 
(left to domestic law) 
Minimum liability limit: between SDR 
1 million ($1.5 million) and SDR 
30 million ($46 million) depending 
on the size of the waste shipment'"" 
Between SDR 10 million ($15.1 million) and 
SDR 40 million ($60.4 million) depending 
on the toxicity and amount of hazardous 
substances released147 
Many states, including developed countries, reported to the treaty 
secretariats that the liability limits are simply too high. The Netherlands, 
for example, reported in its response to the questionnaire from the CR TD 
secretariat that one reason it had not ratified that treaty was that the requi-
site insurance coverage "cannot be obtained on the present insurance 
market .... The current limits of liability [in the treaty] are considered to 
144. CRID Convention, supra note 44, at arr. 9. 
145. HNS Convention, supra note 44, at an. 9. 
146. Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at Annex B. 
147. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Protocol on Civil Uability and 
Compensation far Damage Caused by the Transboumlary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary 
Waters, Annex II, May 21, 2003, UNECE Doc. MT/WAT/2003/1-CP.TEIN2003/3, available at 
http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liabiliry/documents/protocol_e.pdf. 
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be too high as long as they are combined with compulsory insurance."148 
Finland expressed that "retaining the requirement of compulsory insurance 
up to liability limits would in all probability result in small carriers not 
being able to obtain insurance cover, at least not with reasonably priced 
premiums." 149 For the Basel Liability Protocol, Poland stated that the 
minimum limits of liability "could be considered too high for entrepre~ 
neurs in Poland."150 Other nations that stated they had problems with the 
liability limits under the Basel Liability Protocol included Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Serbia, 
Slovakia, and Turkey. 
The objection from developed states that insurance policies cannot 
be obtained is difficult to take at face value. In the developed world, billion 
dollar risks and assets are routinely insured, so it should not be impossible 
to obtain cover for a narrow class of risks running in the tens of millions 
of dollars. Developed states may be more concerned about the added cost 
of insurance premiums, rather than the uninsurability of the damages per se. 
Lack of insurance products might be a larger problem in developing coun~ 
tries, which were especially likely to state that they had not ratified one 
or more of the civil liability treaties because insurance products that could 
148. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., May 7-11, 2001, Replies 
by the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, 2-3, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.2 (Feb. 
23, 200 1), available at http://www .unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp 15 200 1-1 7 a2e. pdf; see 
also Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., Reply by Turkey, 2, 
U.N.Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.5 (Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.unece.org/ 
trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp152001-17a5e.pdf ("(T]he amount of the premium to be paid for 
the possible damages [that] dangerous goods and liquid fuels might cause would reach very high 
amounts .... In fact, it is understood that other organizations and administrations do not have this 
kind of insurance either."). 
149. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., Nov. 5-9, 2001, Replies by 
Finland and Uthuania, 2, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add. 4 (July 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp152001-17a4e.pdf [hereinafter Replies by Finland 
and Uthuania]; see also Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., Nov. 5-9, 2001, Reply 
by Belgium 3-4, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.8 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp152001-17a8f.pdf ("The limitation on liability 
appears too high for transporters .... There are special concerns about obtaining insurance cover-
age, for a reasonable premium in a very limited insurance market. From the point of view of the 
insurers, the limits of liability on transporters remain high and do not provide the insurer sufficient 
protection. These amounts are economically unbearable for small and medium-sized enterprises.") 
(translated from the French original). 
150. See Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on 
Liability and Compensation, Warsaw, Pol., Jan. 18-20, 2006, Poland-Financial Limits and 
Insurance, available at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/poland/poland-q3.doc. 
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cover the liability limits were simply not available. Ghana's response to the 
Basel Liability Protocol qnestionnaire was typical: "Currently in Ghana, 
there are no conventional insurance policies available to cover the liabili-
ties specified .... "151 Tanzania was even more explicit: "[The] [p]rivate 
insurance sector in the country [is] not ready to take up [the] risk of hazard-
ous wastes. "152 Other countries responding to the Basel secretariat that the 
lack of available insurance products was an obstacle to ratification included 
Cambodia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Estonia, Indonesia, Lesotho, Malaysia, 
Mozambique, Peru, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. 153 
Another major reported reason for opposition to the treaties, especially 
from developed states, was the incompatibility of the treaties with domestic 
liability law. In questionnaire responses for the Lugano Convention, numer-
ous countries, including the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Greece, 
Turkey, and Switzerland, pointed to conflicts with domestic law as a major 
reason for refusing to sign or ratify the treaty. 154 The U.K., for example, 
listed five objections to the Lugano Convention, including that "[t]here 
are elements of joint and several liability, which has generally been 
rejected in the United Kingdom, where a proportionate approach is more 
usual."155 Sweden noted that the Convention's definition of compensable 
damage "goes beyond what has been generally accepted in tort legislation 
since the Convention includes a right for compensation for impairment of 
h . ,!56 t e envuonment per se. 
In developing countries, a common reported roadblock to ratification of 
the Basel Liability Protocol and the CRTD Convention was a lack of general 
domestic legal capacity to implement complex liability schemes. The treaties 
151. Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability 
and Compensation, Addis Ababa, Eth., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2004, Ghana-Financial limits and Insurance, 
available at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/ethiopia/financial-limits-ghana%20.doc. 
152. Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability 
and Compensation, Addis Ababa, Eth., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2004, Responses of Participant Countries to 
the Questionnaires, 15, available at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/ethiopia/answers-
quest.doc [hereinafter Responses of Participant Countries]. 
153. See Regional Workshops, supra note 141. 
154. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Responses to the Questionnaire on 
the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting From Activities Dangerous to the Environment 
(Lugano Convention), U.N. Doc. MP.WAT/2001/2CP.TEIA/2001/2 (May 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2001/wat/mp.wat.2001.2.e.pdf. 
155. Id. at 7. 
156. Id. at 6. Summarizing the responses to the Lugano Convention questionnaire, the 
Technical Group of Experts on Liability and Redress for the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol noted that 
states felt that the scope of the Lugano Convention was "too wide and gives too little legal certainty, 
and that its definitions, especially in the field of environmental damage, are too vague." See 
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 56, at 9. 
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require changes to domestic liability law that may necessitate passage of 
conforming statutes, issuance of new insurance regulations, and training 
of judges and lawyers. For developing countries with overstretched or inade-
quate legal systems, such requirements appear to be beyond their capacity 
or may conflict with other national priorities. As Zambia forthrightly 
acknowledged, its law enforcement agents "are not alive to their legal 
d · d · l l "157 B · ' h B l uttes un er envuonmenta aw. osnta s response to t e ase 
Liability Protocol secretariat stated that it could not ratify the treaty 
because it "has [no] environmental Legislation at the state level, [no] real 
Ministry of Environment and state environmental set-up, structures and 
human capacities for implementation."158 Mauritius listed a litany of capac-
ity problems, many of which were mentioned by other nations, such as lack 
of "staff, know-how/expertise, access to information ... communication 
tools, detection methods, [and] availability of emergency response equip-
ment .... "159 Other nations that listed capacity to implement as an obstacle 
to ratification of the Basel Liability Protocol included Bosnia, Botswana, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, and Uganda. 160 
What do these responses tell us about the utility of the Extended Model 
outlined above? It is not surprising that the national responses do not 
explicitly state that protection of domestic firms from transnational lawsuits 
was a reason for nonratification of the treaties. The responses do, however, 
illustrate the centrality of domestic concerns and the careful guarding of 
sovereign prerogatives to set national liability law. The responses also 
highlight that civil liability treaties can impose costs on firms even in the 
absence of any transnational lawsuit brought pursuant to the treaties. These 
near-term costs include obtaining insurance policies, payment of insur-
ance premiums, and adapting to changes in domestic law and procedures. 
A state deciding whether to ratify a civil liability treaty therefore must weigh 
both the near-term and long-term costs against any benefits to be gained 
through ratification. 
The questionnaire responses are most useful as guidance for build-
ing stronger tort remedies in the future. If lack of insurance products in 
157. Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability 
and Compensation, Addis Ababa, Eth., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2004, Zambia-Ratification, available at 
http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/ethiopia/q2-Zambia.doc. 
158. Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability 
and Compensation, Warsaw, Pol., Jan. 18-20, 2006, Bosnia-Ratification, available at http://www.basel.int/ 
legalmatters/regworkshops/poland/bosnia-q2.doc. 
159. Responses of Participant Countries, supra note 152, at 10. 
160. See Regional Workshops, supra note 141. 
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developing states is a roadblock to treaty ratification or implementation, then 
this obstacle might be transformed into a business opportunity for insurance 
providers. If the relatively stringent models of civil liability treaties used in 
the past are deemed objectionable by most states, then we need to consider 
whether consensus could form around less stringent models, with terms that 
would appeal to a wider coalition of parties. And if implementation capacity 
in developing states is an obstacle, then we should consider capacity assis-
tance, which has become common in other kinds of international environ-
mental treaties. 161 Past failures should serve as a springboard for developing 
a new vision of the role of tort remedies in international environmental law. 
III. THOUGHTS ON REFORM 
Despite the litany of past problems in building successful civil liability 
regimes, there is still a pressing need to strengthen tort remedies for 
transboundary environmental damage. The lack of viable legal remedies 
for victims of transboundary pollution is a glaring and longstanding hole 
in international environmental law, and private law solutions, which can 
address transboundary problems without resort to dispute resolution among 
governments, are urgently needed. 
Each environmental risk is different in terms of its character, magni-
tude, and the states affected, so no single policy, treaty, or declaration will 
suffice to strengthen tort remedies for transboundary environmental dam-
age. Multiple approaches are needed, operating on numerous legal fronts. 
This Part discusses how we can learn from the past four decades of efforts 
and begin to reform the international approach to this area of law. The 
solutions proposed here fall into two broad categories: those that reform 
the process and substance of civil liability treaties, with the aim of 
resuscitating consent-based treaty regimes; and those that look outside the 
treaty system toward bottom-up approaches that will strengthen tort reme-
dies through the spread of liability norms. 
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Successful conclusion 
of future civil liability treaties can help to strengthen informal norms 
governing transboundary damage, and at the same time the emergence of 
norms through a variety of domestic and international interactions can 
provide an impetus for states to negotiate and implement treaties. 
Nevertheless, for clarity it makes sense to discuss these two approaches 
separately, as they involve different actors and strategies. 
161. See HUNTER, SALZMAN, & ZAELKE, supra note 51, at 430--37. 
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A. Reform Within the Treaty System 
Civil liability treaties should continue to be one focus of efforts to 
strengthen tort remedies for transboundary environmental damage because 
they carry the imprimatur of state consent. Consent not only lends legiti, 
macy to a regime, but it also indicates that important domestic political 
actors within a state believe that the treaty is in the state's interest, which 
assists long-term implementation.162 International environmental liabil, 
ity law is a field requiring close coordination among national governments 
and among domestic courts, justice ministries, and other legal actors. 
Obtaining consensus on the terms and conditions of tort liability through 
a treaty, and then implementing that treaty after a process of state 
ratification, will remain one of the primary means of achieving and sus, 
taining that level of coordination. 
How can widespread state consent to new civil liability treaties be 
secured? If developed and developing states have in the past con, 
eluded that their interests are best secured through remaining outside 
civil liability regimes, is there any hope for altering incentives in favor 
of regime formation? 
Regime design is an area of increasing overlap between international 
law and international relations scholarship, as it focuses on what legal 
structures or rules will best promote international cooperation and, ulti, 
mately, effectiveness in solving joint problems. 163 One way to improve 
regime design in the civil liability field is to identify different structural 
arrangements that would lower the costs of joining civil liability regimes. 
State concerns about near,term or long,term risks to domestic firms could be 
alleviated through a variety of mechanisms. For example, liability limits in 
the treaties could be lowered to reduce the exposure of individual firms. 
This would likely reduce insurance premiums and increase the prospects 
for more widespread adherence. Treaty negotiators should look closely at 
how liability caps can be used as a flexible means of meeting demands that 
culpable firms be held accountable through tort while at the same time 
addressing competitiveness concerns that the liability will become crushing 
for individual firms. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
is moving toward lowering liability limits in the CRTD Convention, which 
162. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 
CASE W. RES. J. lNT'L L. 387, 405--09 (2000) ("Some scholats have suggested that the legitimacy of 
the process of rule creation itself is a central factor in explaining compliance."). 
163. See George W. Downs eta!., The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: 
Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. ). TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 470 (2000). 
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has not entered into force nearly twenty years after its adoption in 1989. In 
2003, the UNECE began to consider a new draft of the treaty that lowered 
liability limits by as much as fifty percent.164 
Another approach for enhancing regime formation in the civil liabil-
ity field is to move toward layered legal structures that combine liability 
targeted on a single culpable party with compensation funds to which a 
variety of players in a risk-producing industry contribute. The oil spill 
and nuclear liability regimes both incorporate such funds, 165 as does the 
HNS Convention.166 A plaintiff's access to the pooled funds could be 
triggered only if damages exceed a defendant's individual liability limit, so that 
some liability exposure would remain for a responsible party as a deterrent to 
harmful activities. Details of compensation funds would need to be worked 
out for various treaties, including the maximum payments from a fund, the 
methods of contribution, the organizational structure of the entity that 
manages the fund, and the procedures for making claims. 167 But the con-
cept of a lower liability limit for individual firms, combined with estab-
lishment of a compensation fund that would spread risks, is an attractive 
means of securing more widespread acceptance and ratification of civil 
liability rules. 
To be sure, compensation funds somewhat dilute the deterrent incen-
tives of tort. Responsible actors as well as bad actors within an industry 
would all be required to contribute to the fund. With resort to the fund, 
culpable parties would not be held fully and individually responsible for any 
damage they cause. But similar issues exist for liability schemes that allow 
for the purchase of liability insurance. Coverage by liability insurance pre-
sents its own moral hazard problems, diluting individual incentives for 
precaution and spreading losses to actors that did not themselves contribute 
to the damage.168 Yet we deem liability insurance essential to ensuring 
164. See O:mvention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Nov. 3-4, 2003, Consolidated Text of a 
Draft New CRTD as Adopted by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts far Consideration by the Inland Transport 
Committee, U.N. Doc. TRANS/AC.8/8/Add.1 (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://www.unece.org/ 
trans/doc/2003/ac8/TRANS-AC8-08a1e.pdf. 
165. See International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, reprinted in LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CONVENTIONS AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY 
FuND PROTOCOL 25 (2005), available at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/ Conventions%20English.pdf. 
166. Supra note 44, at arts. 13-36. 
167. See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Uability Regimes far the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 58 (1994 ); Daniel, supra note 10, at 240. 
168. The literature on moral hazard in insurance and tort law is voluminous. For prominent 
examples, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcON. 
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adequate compensation for injured parties and often mandate it by law. 
Moreover, even if lowered liability limits or the availability of a com-
pensation fund did dilute deterrence incentives, the negative consequences 
would be offset by countervailing factors. There would be an increased 
chance of treaty ratification as well as increased prospects for compensa-
tion for individuals injured by transboundary harms, due to the pres-
ence of pooled funds. 
Liability rules for transboundary environmental damage can, of course, 
be diluted too far. At the extreme, liability caps could be lowered to a 
few thousand dollars, strict liability could be abolished, and no funds would 
be available as a back-up source of compensation. Such a treaty might be 
viewed as ideal by states committed to protecting liability walls for their 
domestic firms. At best this kind of treaty would be mere symbolism, and 
more likely it would represent a giant step backward for strengthening the 
role of tort in international environmental law. The possibility of a parade 
of horribles involving underdeterrence should not preclude treaty negotia-
tors from seeking terms and conditions that would be more palatable to states, 
however. There is a clear trade-off, which needs to be recognized, between 
the stringency of terms in a civil liability treaty and its prospects for 
political acceptance. 
Apart from adjusting the substance of civil liability treaties, progress in 
strengthening tort remedies through treaties can also be accomplished 
through procedural reforms. Recall Table 2, depicting directly conflicting 
interests of states in the Extended Model and the resulting prediction of 
deadlock in a hypothetical negotiation over liability rules. If the only issues 
being negotiated involve liability-who can be sued and how much will be 
paid-the discussions can easily become a zero-sum game.169 
To break the impasse, negotiators should look outside the narrow 
confines of the liability box to introduce a broader range of nonliability 
issues into the negotiating mix, providing some basis for integrative 
bargaining.170 The basic reform here is what Lawrence Susskind of MIT and 
REV. 941 (1963); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 
80 J. POL. EcON. 623 (1972); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 
(1979). For a historical overview of the role of moral hazard in insurance, see Tom Baker, On the 
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
169. See supra Part II.B.l. 
170. Integrative bargaining involves a shared search for options, focusing on the underlying 
interests of parties, whereas distributive bargaining, which has heretofore been the norm in liability 
discussions, focuses more on the positions and relative political strength of the parties. See Nancy D. 
Erbe, Appreciating Mediation's Global Role in Promoting Good Governance, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
355,388 (2006); Young, supra note 71, at 361. 
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the Harvard Program on Negotiation has called "issue linkage," a variation 
of the classic political strategy of logrolling: "You give me something that I 
want very much, and I will give you something important in exchange."171 
What other nonliability issues should be introduced into the mix? 
Side deals could involve related environmental issues (such as treaty gov-
ernance, technical assistance, or emissions control requirements) or unrelated 
issues, such as trade concessions, security arrangements, or political support 
in international fora. A developing state might agree, for example, to votes 
on certain U.N. Security Council resolutions in exchange for the coopera-
tion of developed states on the terms and conditions of environmental 
liability rules. A state concerned about its exposure to a specific type of 
transboundary environmental risk might agree to a lower liability cap in 
exchange for more substantive obligations by industrialized states in the 
realms of prevention, safety equipment, or technical assistance. The effect 
of this kind of issue linkage is that states may reconceive their self-
interest as they consider a broader package of issues, rather than liability 
rules in isolation. 
Negotiating civil liability rules for environmental damage in smaller, 
regional fora may also help to facilitate a consensus that can stick through 
the ratification and implementation processes. Reducing the number of par-
ties at the table not only reduces transaction costs involved in drafting an 
agreement, but may also increase the prospects for regime formation if the 
parties have similar economies and legal systems. Regional agreements may 
also help to overcome a reluctance to ratify civil liability rules that involve 
mutual recognition of judgments. 
A regional approach to transnational environmental liability issues has 
been implemented successfully in Nordic countries, following adoption of a 
liability regime over thirty years ago. 172 More recently, the European Union 
adopted a Directive on environmental liability that applies to all twenty-
seven Member States.m The primary goal of the Directive is to estab-
lish liability rules for hazardous waste spills, wetland destruction, and other 
171. LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENviRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE 
GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 91 (1994). 
172. See Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 591. For more information on the role of this con-
vention in transboundary disputes, see Phillips, supra note 30. 
173. Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April2004 
on Environmental Liability With Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental 
Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 [hereinafter Directive]. 
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environmental harms within Member States.174 Its language on transboundary 
environmental damage is vague,175 and it will likely be several years before 
the Directive is applied to an incident where the damage is located in one 
Member State and the actor causing the damage is located in another. 
Nevertheless, it remains the most recent example of crafting and imple-
menting supranational liability rules for environmental damage. 
As much as politics and regime design matter for strengthening tort 
remedies in international environmental law, we should not forget the role 
of unpredictable, exogenous events as a spur to regime formation. Major 
accidents involving significant loss of life and economic disruption across 
borders can highlight the absence of legal remedies and the need for an 
agreement on the liability rules that will govern such disasters. 176 Indeed, 
past regimes were often formed or strengthened in the wake of massive 
accidents with transboundary consequences. The 1967 Torrey Canyon spill 
highlighted the inadequacies of then-existing legal liability instruments 
for oil spills and led to the rapid negotiation of the 1969 Civil Liability 
Convention. 177 The nuclear liability regime was strengthened in the 1990s 
following the 1986 Chernobyl accident,178 and the release of cyanide wastes 
into the Danube from the Baia Mare mine in Romania in 2000 led directly 
to negotiations on a liability protocol governing transboundary industrial 
accidents in Europe.179 These types of incidents can serve as focusing events 
174. The Directive applies to damages to unique environmental resources such as protected 
species, habitats, and waters. See id. It does not apply to more traditional forms of damages such 
as property damage and health damage. For an analysis of the Directive's drafting history, see 
Chris Clarke, The Proposed EC Liability Directive: Half-Way Through Co-Decision, 12 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 254 (2003 ). 
175. In exploring the need for a new directive, the European Commission initially pointed 
to transboundary environmental damage as a primary reason why environmental liability needed to 
be addressed at the Community level, rather than within individual Member States. See White 
Paper on Environmental Uability, at 25-26, COM (2000) 66 final (Feb. 9, 2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/liability/pdf/el_full.pdf. However, the Directive itself refers only 
to consultation among Member States and possible intervention by the Commission in the event of 
transboundary damage that affects several Member States. See Directive, supra note 173, at art. 15. 
176. As Oran Young has noted, exogenous events help to overcome the "logjam" in which 
negotiations bog down in a "sparting match" of jockeying for positional advantage. Young, supra 
note 71, at 371-72. 
177. Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Economic Analysis of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 
37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 179, 179 (2006). 
178. See Varda Lamm, The Protocol Amending the 1963 Vienna Convention, in International 
Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period (OECD and IAEA 2006), available at www.nea.fr/ 
html/law/chernobyl/LAMM.pdf. 
179. See Stephen Stec et al., Transboundary Environmental Governance and the Baia Mare Cyanide 
Spill, 27 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 639 (2001 ). 
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that raise pressure on political elites to negotiate a legal response, elevating 
environmental liability issues on the international environmental agenda. 180 
B. Reform Outside the Treaty System 
While state consent lends legitimacy to treaty-based regimes once the 
regime is established, obtaining this consent has also emerged, as we have 
seen, as the primary obstacle to regime formation. The requirement of con-
sent has derailed most of the treaties listed in Table 1, as they have not 
attracted sufficient ratifications to enter into force, even after years of labor 
to draft a treaty text. The reforms discussed above will improve the pros-
pects for forming workable regimes, but given the track record of civil 
liability treaties, these reforms cannot be the complete solution. 
A top-down approach of multilateral treaty making among govern-
ments, followed by implementation of the treaties through domestic law, is 
not the only method of generating international legal cooperation in this 
area of law. The other major avenue for strengthening tort remedies in 
international environmental law is a bottom-up approach that would rely 
on transnational networks of citizens, government officials, NGOs, and 
attorneys to push for changes in domestic and international law that would 
facilitate redress for transboundary environmental damage. Such a decen-
tralized strategy could have two beneficial impacts. It could lead to the 
emergence of norms regarding liability for transboundary pollution that 
could take root entirely outside any treaty-making process, even in the face 
of continued recalcitrance by powerful states. It could also lead to modi-
fication of state preferences from within and, ultimately, prompt renewed 
governmental efforts to codify liability norms and principles in treaties. 
A norm-based strategy would be grounded in intellectual traditions, 
such as constructivism and the legal process school, which contend that state 
preferences are often highly contingent and can be shaped through domes-
tic politics, transnational interactions, norm internalization, and changing 
cultural identities. 181 In these traditions, a state's preferences are not viewed 
180. See ]OHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 94-95 
(2d ed. 1995). 
181. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Address, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. 
REv. 623 (1992) (arguing that states comply with international law mainly because of norm 
internalization in the social, political, and legal spheres); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the 
World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855 
(1998) (criticizing realists and institutionalists for their assumption that state identities are "given 
and fixed" and arguing that identities and interests are instead "socially constructed"); Alexander 
Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 
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as antecedent to its interactions with other states in the international sys-
tem; preferences are in fact shaped through that interaction, 182 as well 
as through a complex domestic dialogue of actors. If "what states want" is 
socially constructed, then opportunities arise to shape the political, legal, 
and social landscape that gives rise to these preferences. 
Both constructivism and legal process schools highlight the impor-
tance of norms (as opposed to formal treaties or sanctions) in shaping 
how states behave. In extensive writing on norm-based theories of inter-
national law, Harold Hongju Koh has argued that international norms 
h h " . 1 1 1 "183 1 . 1 f emerge t roug a transnauona ega process, a comp ex mterp ay o 
governmental and nongovernmental actors engaging in "vertical strategies 
of interaction, interpretation, and internalization."184 According to Koh, 
norms can be "uploaded" from domestic to internationallaw. 185 Norms can 
also be "downloaded" from international law into domestic law (such as the 
norm against disappearance), as social, political, and legal actors gradually 
accept the legitimacy of an international norm and promote its adoption into 
domestic policy and law. 186 Norms can also be "horizontally transplanted" 
from one national legal system to another. 187 International norms have a 
direct policy effect if they are codified into domestic law, but they can also 
have indirect policy effects as tools in the hands of advocates to criticize 
governments, mobilize public opinion, and prevent backsliding on inter-
national commitments. 188 
To strengthen private remedies for transboundary environmental 
damage outside of a process of treaty ratification, several norms would need 
to emerge. One norm would support procedural access to justice for for-
eign plaintiffs seeking remedies in the courts of the source state where the 
391, 398 (1992) (arguing that state actors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry 
around with them in inter-state interactions, and that they instead "define their interests in the 
process of defining situations"). 
182. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004) (explaining the role of accultura-
tion, "the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the 
surrounding culture," in the development of international human rights law). 
183. Koh, supra note 67, at 2655-56. 
184. Id. 
185. See Koh, supra note 181, at 642-43; see also Koh, supra note 42, at 746. 
186. Koh, supra note 42, at 746. 
187. Id. 
188. Harold Koh has identified three possible routes through which international norms 
become internalized into domestic systems: social, political, and legal internalization. Only legal 
internalization involves direct codification into law. The other two routes involve the population 
at large or political elites adhering to a norm because they believe it has legitimacy. Koh, supra 
note 67, at 2656-57. 
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harm originated; another would support domestic court jurisdiction over 
foreign entities causing internal damage. 189 More broadly, tort remedies will 
play a larger role in international environmental governance only if a "logic 
of appropriateness"190 emerges in which states (and domestic courts) begin to 
confront transboundary tortfeasors with a realistic prospect of tort liability 
and payment of damages. These norms would not have the specificity of a 
formal civil liability treaty, and they may lack uniform content regarding 
minimum or maximum damages and the standard of liability, but they 
would have the advantages of flexibility and the ability to take root across 
diverse legal cultures-"transform[ing], mutat[ing], and percolat[ing] up and 
down, from the public to the private, from the domestic to the international 
level and back down again."191 
How might these norms emerge? One mechanism could be through 
the coordinated activities of what Koh has called "transnational norm 
entrepreneurs" (TNEs), which he defines as nonstate actors who seek to 
mobilize public opinion and change government policy.192 Acting as TNEs, 
NGOs in several different countries could push for reforms to domestic 
law to facilitate redress for transboundary environmental damage. NGOs 
might advocate, for example, for elimination of laws and procedures that 
discriminate against foreign plaintiffs suing in local courts. Or, they might 
advocate for the equivalent of national long arm statutes or judicially-
created effects tests that would allow municipal courts to assume jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants who cause injury inside the territory. In alliance 
with governments, TNEs could support issuance of declarations in inter-
national fora regarding guiding principles for tort remedies for transboundary 
environmental damage. 
Firms concerned about competitiveness may also act as TNEs, pres-
suring their own governments to establish more harmonized rules for tort 
liability. For example, a series of ad hoc domestic judgments in tort suits 
relating to environmental damage, resulting in contradictory decision rules 
189. Norms on non-discriminatory access to justice are already emerging in international dec-
larations and conventions. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 10; U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 127, at art. 32. 
190. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 16, 33 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (defining the 
"logic of appropriateness" as an inquiry by an actor into the correctness of behavior "consistent with 
that actor's identity or sense of self'). 
191. Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 184 (1996). 
192. Koh, supra note 181, at 647-48; see also Young, supra note 71, at 364 ("[I)t would be a 
serious mistake to overlook the role of transnational alliances among influential interest groups in 
developing and maintaining regimes at the international level."). 
Beyond the Liability Wall 899 
and widely varying damages, may prompt firms to advocate for more uni-
form rules (likely including liability caps) that would be negotiated 
internationally by governments. 
One successful example of nonstate TNEs working on transboundary 
pollution issues is the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal 
Access Act (UTPRAA), which lowers liability walls between the United 
States and Canada by specifying choice of law rules in transboundary suits. 
The UTPRAA had its origins in a joint report by the Canadian and 
American Bar Associations and was approved by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Uniform Conference of 
Canada in 1982 as a vehicle for the "the equalization of rights and reme-
dies of citizens in Canada and the U.S.A. affected by pollution emanating 
from the other jurisdiction."193 The UTPRAA was implemented not through 
a bilateral treaty, but rather through direct adoptions in U.S. state legisla-
tures and Canadian provincial legislatures,194 in effect bypassing national 
consent to create law at the subnational level. It can serve as a model for 
how like-minded attorneys and activists in different nations can cooperate 
horizontally and vertically to generate legal norms on transboundary 
pollution, without a formal treaty. 
Activists seeking stronger remedies for transboundary environmental 
damage could also push states to adopt self-help remedies in the absence 
of formal intergovernmental cooperation. Two scholars recently argued 
that Ontario should revise domestic legislation to make it easier to sue 
U.S. firms in Ontario courts for transboundary air pollution damage.195 
Citizens concerned about hazards from the international transport of haz-
ardous substances could push their own states to enact domestic legislation 
requiring payment of port fees or posting of bonds by hazardous cargo carriers, 
or states could enact environmental taxes to ensure that funds are available 
for environmental response in the event of a toxic release. Past scholarship 
has largely overlooked the potential for states to enact unilateral remedies as 
a response to transboundary risks. Such remedies are attractive because they 
are enacted pursuant to domestic law and require no intergovernmental 
negotiations, but their role is somewhat limited because they would need to 
193. See Michael I. Jeffrey, Transboundary Pollution and Cross-Border Remedies, 18 CAN.-U.S. 
L.J. 173, 177 (1992) (quoting Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, prefatory 
note at 5 ). 
194. The Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act has been adopted by seven 
U.S. states (Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin) and 
three Canadian provinces (Manitoba, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island). See list of adoptions at 
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusVuniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utpraa.asp. 
195. See Hsu & Parrish, supra note 39. 
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be based on a background condition of jurisdiction. They are appropriate 
only for classes of transboundary environmental risks, such as imports of 
hazardous materials, where the state affected by the risk has some legal 
jurisdiction over the entity producing the risk. 
International norms governing transboundary environmental damage 
may also emerge through rulings of international tribunals and domestic 
courts. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, is now hear, 
ing a complaint brought by Argentina challenging Uruguay's construction 
of two paper mills on the River Uruguay.196 If the ICJ rules on the merits, 
this will become one of only a handful of cases where the ICJ has directly 
addressed rights and responsibilities surrounding transboundary envi, 
ronmental issues. 197 
Climate change has emerged as one of the most active areas of inter, 
national environmental litigation, and norms regarding transboundary 
environmental damage and the transnational procedures for seeking a rem, 
edy could emerge through these cases. The past five years have seen an 
explosion of litigation in domestic and international fora, including: 
• Suits in the United States, Germany, and Australia regarding 
the application of environmental impact review statutes to 
climate change impacts from new programs and projects; 
• A suit brought by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference against the 
United States at the Inter,American Commission on Human 
Rights, alleging that U.S. greenhouse gas emissions violate 
Inuit human rights; 
• Petitions to the World Heritage Committee of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
requesting listing, as endangered, world heritage sites threatened 
by climate change; 
• A suit pending in the Second Circuit brought by U.S. states 
and environmental groups against major electricity producers 
196. Argentina's complaint alleged that the mills will irreparably damage the river ecosystem 
and will hinder Argentina's rights of equitable use. The complaint also alleged that Uruguay failed to 
comply with a 1975 bilateral treaty on management of the river. On January 23, 2007, the ICJ 
denied Argentina's request for provisional measures (equivalent to a preliminary injunction) and 
allowed construction of the mills to proceed, but Argentina is continuing to pursue its objections on 
the merits. See Docket of ICJ Pending Cases, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php. 
197. The ICJ has addressed only a handful of other cases involving transboundary environmental 
issues. These include the Gabcikovo-Nagyrnaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 l.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25, 
1997), and the Nuclear Test Cases (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974I.C.J. 253, 267-72, 1974l.Cj. 457,472-78. 
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alleging that their greenhouse gas emissions constitute a 
nuisance; and 
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• A suit pending in the Ninth Circuit brought by California 
against major auto manufacturers alleging that mobile source 
emissions of greenhouse gases constitute a nuisance. 198 
The bodies hearing these suits may become "law-declaring fora" that 
strengthen international norms on transboundary pollution through "defin-
ing, elaborating, and testing the definition of particular norms and opining 
about their violation."199 If U.S. courts begin to rule that greenhouse gas 
emissions can constitute a nuisance and provide a remedy in injunction or 
money damages, then a wave of domestic climate change suits will likely 
follow, as well as transnational suits in U.S. courts and elsewhere, brought 
by foreign entities against U.S. firms. As firms distinguish themselves as 
leaders or laggards on addressing their emissions of greenhouse gases, 
advocates can begin to select defendants and argue that laggards are 
deviating from a standard of ordinary care regarding the global impact of 
their emissions.200 
The current wave of climate litigation is a classic bottom-up legal 
strategy that is occurring in tandem with the public law process of 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol (outside the United States) and negoti-
ating a successor convention. Transnational climate litigation will test 
the current robustness of liability walls, as courts will undoubtedly con-
front novel questions of jurisdiction, remedies, enforcement of judgments, 
and forum non conveniens. Even if these suits are unsuccessful, they will 
nevertheless have a political impact that could be helpful in strengthening 
international legal norms related to transboundary pollution. The suits 
focus public attention on the fact that climate change has real victims 
who can be located thousands of miles away from the major emissions 
sources. Climate change may come to be viewed not just as an issue of 
governance of the global commons, but rather as a series of increasingly 
severe transboundary impacts, some of which will be suitable for private 
law remedies. 
Can the gradual spread of international norms regarding liability for 
transboundary environmental damage really make a difference in the 
198. For a discussion of these cases and an overview of current trends in climate litigation, 
see Hari Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational 
Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005). 
199. Koh, supra note 181, at 650. 
200. See David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radicnl Idea: Tort-Based Climate Litigation, 
28 COLUMj. ENvrL. L. 1, 28 (2003) (discussing potential defendants in climate-related tort suits). 
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outcome of actual disputes? International human rights law provides some 
cause for optimism. It is perhaps the paradigmatic example of international 
law that operates primarily through norm-internalization, rather than 
through overt, treaty-based sanctions against noncomplying states. 201 
Treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and declarations such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have contributed to the 
development of international human rights law because they enunciate 
clear norms and expectations viewed as legitimate by most public and pri-
vate actors, not because of formal compliance mechanisms.202 Human rights 
norms, once established, then become interpreted in formal judicial settings, 
such as war crimes tribunals and domestic courts, and can also be used by 
NGOs, attorneys, and government officials as standards by which to judge 
and criticize national behavior. The spread of human rights norms cannot be 
explained by self-interest alone. As Oona Hathaway has noted, "human 
rights treaties impinge on core areas of national sovereignty without 
promising obvious material or strategic benefits."203 
There are some crucial differences between the human rights context 
and transboundary environmental damage, however. Human rights norms 
against torture, slavery, and genocide have deeply rooted histories and 
definitions that are widely accepted (though the debate over treatment of 
suspects in terrorism cases highlights that the definitions are not universally 
agreed upon). The practice of these prohibited acts sparks revulsion and 
moral outrage. T ransboundary pollution, in contrast, results in most cases 
from the normal functioning of economies and is unlikely to ever rise to 
the level of a jus cogens peremptory norm. It is not possible to outlaw all 
transboundary pollution, and there is little consensus on when transboundary 
environmental damage has risen to a sufficient level of seriousness to result 
in legal sanction. 
Moreover, human rights norms have evolved over decades through 
sustained advocacy by governments and NGOs, promotion by powerful states 
and the United Nations, and a high degree of public concern. In contrast, 
there are currently few transnational norm entrepreneurs promoting the 
201. See Koh, supra note 29, at 1407. 
202. For example, the Omvention Against Torture has weak compliance and enforcement mecha-
nisms. The dispute resolution procedures in the Convention Against Torture are cumbersome and 
lengthy, involving a series of reports, investigations, and mediation by a "Committee Against Torture." 
The Convention provides no significant penalties for noncomplying states. See Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 20--22, Dec. 10, 
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984). 
203. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 
1935, 1938 (2002). 
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strengthening of tort remedies in international environmental law. It 
remains a back burner issue in environment and foreign ministries. The 
number of NGOs focusing on any transboundary environmental issue other 
than climate change and wildlife protection remains quite small, and the 
narrower issue of civil liability for transboundary environmental harm has 
not been a significant agenda item for environmental activists. 
For norms to emerge in this area of law, a higher degree of public 
awareness and activism about tort remedies needs to evolve in the future, 
perhaps by riding on the coattails of the climate change movement. The 
development of international environmental law has traditionally lagged 
innovations in international human rights law by one or two decades, and 
public awareness will likely build over time. Indeed, a time may come when 
support for viable legal remedies for transboundary pollution victims is seen 
as a necessary component of a government's political, moral, and envi-
ronmental leadership. 
CONCLUSION 
Though in its four-decade history, international environmental liability 
law has been the subject of high hopes, rhetorical commitments, and 
extensive negotiation, it still remains in its infancy. This Article has shown 
that tort remedies can play an important role in international environmental 
law by complementing our primary regulatory treaties and providing an 
avenue for injured parties to seek redress. But given the track record, it is 
clear that enhancing tort's role in international environmental law is far 
more challenging than the use of tort litigation in domestic environmental 
suits. Whereas tort preexisted environmental regulation in domestic law, in 
the international sphere states are looking at adopting new liability rules 
prospectively, internationalizing domestic tort rules and potentially imposing 
new kinds of liability on domestic firms. States have, for the most part, 
approached civil liability negotiations with reluctance, recalcitrance, and, 
ultimately, rejection. 
Regime theory sheds light on the reasons for the relative stasis in the 
civil liability field by focusing on states' underlying interests and the role of 
liability walls in protecting domestic firms. The hurdles to future cooperation 
on negotiated civil liability rules are significant, but they are not insurmount-
able. Skilled treaty negotiators should aim to find a zone of agreement by 
identifying treaty terms and legal structures that are more palatable to states. 
Negotiations among states with similar economies and legal systems may 
help to avoid the acrimony that has surrounded global discussions on liability. 
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At the same time, attorneys and activists should continue to push for stronger 
tort remedies through bottom-up strategies of litigation, advocacy, and 
norm promotion. 
The issue of tort's role in international environmental law is not going 
away, nor should it. Liability issues continue to be debated because they 
cut to the core question of whether international environmental law should 
involve only governmental obligations to monitor and to prevent ecological 
damage, or whether it should broaden to provide a viable remedy to citizens 
when ecological damage does occur. Understanding the causes of conflict 
in this area of law and implementing the reforms proposed in this Article 
will help to strengthen tort remedies in the future. 
